Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2020/12/04"
 3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2023/06/22"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done
13by adversaries to hide malware.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream"
20note = """## Setup
21
22If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
23"""
24risk_score = 47
25rule_id = "4bd1c1af-79d4-4d37-9efa-6e0240640242"
26severity = "medium"
27tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
28timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
29type = "eql"
30
31query = '''
32process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
33  process.args : "?:\\*:*" and process.args_count == 1
34'''
35
36
37[[rule.threat]]
38framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
39[[rule.threat.technique]]
40id = "T1564"
41name = "Hide Artifacts"
42reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
43[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
44id = "T1564.004"
45name = "NTFS File Attributes"
46reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004/"
47
48
49
50[rule.threat.tactic]
51id = "TA0005"
52name = "Defense Evasion"
53reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"