Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/11/15"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "m365_defender", "crowdstrike"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
  6[transform]
  7[[transform.osquery]]
  8label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
  9query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
 10
 11[[transform.osquery]]
 12label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
 13query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
 14
 15[[transform.osquery]]
 16label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
 17query = """
 18SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
 19NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
 20user_account == null)
 21"""
 22
 23[[transform.osquery]]
 24label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
 25query = """
 26SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
 27services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
 28authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
 29"""
 30
 31
 32[rule]
 33author = ["Elastic"]
 34description = """
 35Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This
 36is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based
 37on the process name.
 38"""
 39from = "now-9m"
 40index = [
 41    "winlogbeat-*",
 42    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 43    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
 44    "endgame-*",
 45    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
 46    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
 47]
 48language = "eql"
 49license = "Elastic License v2"
 50name = "Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name"
 51note = """## Triage and analysis
 52
 53### Investigating Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name
 54
 55Identifies the execution of a process with a single character process name, differing from the original file name. This is often done by adversaries while staging, executing temporary utilities, or trying to bypass security detections based on the process name.
 56
 57> **Note**:
 58> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
 59
 60#### Possible investigation steps
 61
 62- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 63- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 64- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, command line and any spawned child processes.
 65- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
 66  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
 67  - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
 68    - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
 69      - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
 70      - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 71        - $osquery_0
 72    - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
 73    - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
 74      - $osquery_1
 75      - $osquery_2
 76      - $osquery_3
 77  - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
 78- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
 79
 80
 81### False positive analysis
 82
 83- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
 84
 85### Response and remediation
 86
 87- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 88- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 89- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
 90  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
 91  - Stop suspicious processes.
 92  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
 93  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
 94- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
 95- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
 96- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 97- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 98"""
 99
100setup = """## Setup
101
102This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
103
104Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
105
106### Additional data sources
107
108This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
109
110- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
111- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
112- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
113"""
114
115risk_score = 47
116rule_id = "17c7f6a5-5bc9-4e1f-92bf-13632d24384d"
117severity = "medium"
118tags = [
119    "Domain: Endpoint",
120    "OS: Windows",
121    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
122    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
123    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
124    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
125    "Data Source: Sysmon",
126    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
127    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
128    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
129    "Noise: Medium",
130    "Performance: Normal",
131    "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
132    "Platform: Windows",
133    "Resources: Osquery",
134]
135timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
136type = "eql"
137
138query = '''
139process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and 
140 process.name regex~ """[a-z0-9]\.exe""" and process.pe.original_file_name != null
141'''
142
143
144[[rule.threat]]
145framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
146[[rule.threat.technique]]
147id = "T1036"
148name = "Masquerading"
149reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
150[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
151id = "T1036.003"
152name = "Rename Legitimate Utilities"
153reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"
154
155
156
157[rule.threat.tactic]
158id = "TA0005"
159name = "Defense Evasion"
160reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"