PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2022/01/24"
 3integration = ["windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2024/10/28"
 6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
 7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Detects PowerShell scripts that have the capability of requesting kerberos tickets, which is a common step in
13Kerberoasting toolkits to crack service accounts.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
17language = "kuery"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request"
20note = """## Triage and analysis
21
22### Investigating PowerShell Kerberos Ticket Request
23
24PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks, making it available for use in various environments, creating an attractive way for attackers to execute code.
25
26Accounts associated with a service principal name (SPN) are viable targets for Kerberoasting attacks, which use brute force to crack the user password, which is used to encrypt a Kerberos TGS ticket.
27
28Attackers can use PowerShell to request these Kerberos tickets, with the intent of extracting them from memory to perform Kerberoasting.
29
30#### Possible investigation steps
31
32- Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics.
33- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
34- Investigate if the script was executed, and if so, which account was targeted.
35- Validate if the account has an SPN associated with it.
36- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
37- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
38- Check if the script has any other functionality that can be potentially malicious.
39- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
40- Review event ID [4769](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769) related to this account and service name for additional information.
41
42### False positive analysis
43
44- A possible false positive can be identified if the script content is not malicious/harmful or does not request Kerberos tickets for user accounts, as computer accounts are not vulnerable to Kerberoasting due to complex password requirements and policy.
45
46### Response and remediation
47
48- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
49- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. Prioritize privileged accounts.
50- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
51- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
52- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
53"""
54references = [
55    "https://cobalt.io/blog/kerberoast-attack-techniques",
56    "https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1",
57]
58risk_score = 47
59rule_id = "eb610e70-f9e6-4949-82b9-f1c5bcd37c39"
60setup = """## Setup
61
62The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
63Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:

1
2Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:

 1"""
 2severity = "medium"
 3tags = [
 4    "Domain: Endpoint",
 5    "OS: Windows",
 6    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 7    "Tactic: Credential Access",
 8    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 9    "Data Source: PowerShell Logs",
10]
11timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
12type = "query"
13
14query = '''
15event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
16  powershell.file.script_block_text : (
17    KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
18  ) and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-20") and
19  not powershell.file.script_block_text : (
20    ("sentinelbreakpoints" and ("Set-PSBreakpoint" or "Set-HookFunctionTabs")) or
21    ("function global" and "\\windows\\sentinel\\4")
22  )
23'''
24
25
26[[rule.threat]]
27framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
28[[rule.threat.technique]]
29id = "T1003"
30name = "OS Credential Dumping"
31reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
32
33[[rule.threat.technique]]
34id = "T1558"
35name = "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"
36reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/"
37[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
38id = "T1558.003"
39name = "Kerberoasting"
40reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/"
41
42
43
44[rule.threat.tactic]
45id = "TA0006"
46name = "Credential Access"
47reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
48[[rule.threat]]
49framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
50[[rule.threat.technique]]
51id = "T1059"
52name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
53reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
54[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
55id = "T1059.001"
56name = "PowerShell"
57reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
58
59
60
61[rule.threat.tactic]
62id = "TA0002"
63name = "Execution"
64reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"