FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation

This rule detects a FortiCloud SSO login followed by administrator account creation on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of the FG-IR-26-060 attack pattern, where threat actors authenticate via SAML-based SSO bypass and immediately create local administrator accounts for persistence.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/01/28"
  3integration = ["fortinet_fortigate"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10This rule detects a FortiCloud SSO login followed by administrator account creation on the same FortiGate device
 11within 15 minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of the FG-IR-26-060 attack pattern, where threat
 12actors authenticate via SAML-based SSO bypass and immediately create local administrator accounts for persistence.
 13"""
 14from = "now-30m"
 15index = ["logs-fortinet_fortigate.*"]
 16interval = "10m"
 17language = "eql"
 18license = "Elastic License v2"
 19name = "FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation"
 20note = """## Triage and analysis
 21
 22### Investigating FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation
 23
 24This alert indicates that a FortiCloud SSO login was followed by an administrator account creation event on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This two-event sequence is the core attack pattern observed in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.
 25
 26The attack flow is: authenticate via FortiCloud SSO using a crafted SAML assertion, then immediately create local administrator accounts to maintain access even after the SSO vulnerability is patched.
 27
 28### Possible investigation steps
 29
 30- Review the SSO login event for the FortiCloud account used and the source IP. Determine whether the SSO account belongs to the organization.
 31- Check the admin creation event for the names of accounts created and the access profiles assigned (especially super_admin).
 32- Assess the timing between events. In the observed campaign, admin creation occurs within seconds of SSO login. A tight time correlation is a strong indicator of compromise.
 33- Review `observer.name` to identify the targeted device and verify whether FortiCloud SSO is intentionally enabled. Run `get system admin` to list all current administrator accounts.
 34- Check whether the same SSO account or source IP targeted other devices. Look for configuration exports, firewall policy changes, or VPN modifications following the admin creation.
 35
 36### False positive analysis
 37
 38- An authorized administrator logging in via FortiCloud SSO and creating a new admin account as part of normal operations.
 39- Initial device onboarding where SSO login and account setup occur in the same session.
 40
 41### Response and remediation
 42
 43- If unauthorized, delete all administrator accounts created during the session and disable FortiCloud SSO immediately.
 44- Restore configuration from a known-clean backup and rotate all credentials including LDAP/AD accounts connected to the device.
 45- Upgrade FortiOS to a patched version and engage incident response for the affected device and any downstream systems.
 46- If the activity is expected, document the administrative session and verify it was authorized. Consider creating accounts through a separate session to avoid triggering this correlation."""
 47references = [
 48    "https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060",
 49    "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios",
 50    "https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/fortinet_fortigate",
 51    "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/01/28/fortinet-releases-guidance-address-ongoing-exploitation-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026",
 52]
 53risk_score = 73
 54rule_id = "e3a7b1c2-5d9f-4e8a-b6c3-2f1d4e5a6b7c"
 55severity = "high"
 56tags = [
 57    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 58    "Tactic: Persistence",
 59    "Tactic: Initial Access",
 60    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 61    "Domain: Network",
 62    "Domain: Identity",
 63    "Data Source: Fortinet",
 64    "Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate",
 65    "Noise: Low",
 66    "Performance: Fast",
 67    "Profile: Recommended",
 68    "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
 69]
 70timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 71type = "eql"
 72
 73query = '''
 74sequence by observer.name with maxspan=15m
 75  [authentication where data_stream.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
 76    event.action == "login" and event.outcome == "success" and
 77    (fortinet.firewall.method == "sso" or fortinet.firewall.ui like~ "sso*")]
 78  [any where data_stream.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
 79    event.code == "0100044547" and
 80    fortinet.firewall.cfgpath == "system.admin" and
 81    fortinet.firewall.action == "Add"]
 82'''
 83
 84
 85[[rule.threat]]
 86framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 87
 88[[rule.threat.technique]]
 89id = "T1136"
 90name = "Create Account"
 91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
 92
 93[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 94id = "T1136.001"
 95name = "Local Account"
 96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
 97
 98[rule.threat.tactic]
 99id = "TA0003"
100name = "Persistence"
101reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
102
103[[rule.threat]]
104framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
105
106[[rule.threat.technique]]
107id = "T1190"
108name = "Exploit Public-Facing Application"
109reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/"
110
111[rule.threat.tactic]
112id = "TA0001"
113name = "Initial Access"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

Triage and analysis

Investigating FortiGate SSO Login Followed by Administrator Account Creation

This alert indicates that a FortiCloud SSO login was followed by an administrator account creation event on the same FortiGate device within 15 minutes. This two-event sequence is the core attack pattern observed in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.

The attack flow is: authenticate via FortiCloud SSO using a crafted SAML assertion, then immediately create local administrator accounts to maintain access even after the SSO vulnerability is patched.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review the SSO login event for the FortiCloud account used and the source IP. Determine whether the SSO account belongs to the organization.
  • Check the admin creation event for the names of accounts created and the access profiles assigned (especially super_admin).
  • Assess the timing between events. In the observed campaign, admin creation occurs within seconds of SSO login. A tight time correlation is a strong indicator of compromise.
  • Review observer.name to identify the targeted device and verify whether FortiCloud SSO is intentionally enabled. Run get system admin to list all current administrator accounts.
  • Check whether the same SSO account or source IP targeted other devices. Look for configuration exports, firewall policy changes, or VPN modifications following the admin creation.

False positive analysis

  • An authorized administrator logging in via FortiCloud SSO and creating a new admin account as part of normal operations.
  • Initial device onboarding where SSO login and account setup occur in the same session.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, delete all administrator accounts created during the session and disable FortiCloud SSO immediately.
  • Restore configuration from a known-clean backup and rotate all credentials including LDAP/AD accounts connected to the device.
  • Upgrade FortiOS to a patched version and engage incident response for the affected device and any downstream systems.
  • If the activity is expected, document the administrative session and verify it was authorized. Consider creating accounts through a separate session to avoid triggering this correlation.

References

Related rules

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