File Transfer Utility Launched from Unusual Parent

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2025/02/21"
  3integration = ["endpoint"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10This rule leverages ESQL to detect the execution of unusual file transfer utilities on Linux systems. Attackers may use
 11these utilities to exfiltrate data from a compromised system. ESQL rules have limited fields available in its alert
 12documents. Make sure to review the original documents to aid in the investigation of this alert.
 13"""
 14from = "now-61m"
 15interval = "1h"
 16language = "esql"
 17license = "Elastic License v2"
 18name = "File Transfer Utility Launched from Unusual Parent"
 19note = """ ## Triage and analysis
 20
 21> **Disclaimer**:
 22> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
 23
 24### Investigating File Transfer Utility Launched from Unusual Parent
 25
 26File transfer utilities like scp, ftp, and rsync are essential for data movement in Linux environments. However, adversaries can exploit these tools to exfiltrate sensitive data. The detection rule identifies suspicious executions of these utilities by monitoring process activities, focusing on rare occurrences and unique agent IDs, which may indicate unauthorized data transfers. This helps in early detection of potential data breaches.
 27
 28### Possible investigation steps
 29
 30- Review the process.command_line field to understand the exact command executed and assess if it aligns with typical usage patterns or if it appears suspicious.
 31- Examine the process.parent.executable field to determine the parent process that initiated the file transfer utility, which may provide insights into whether the execution was part of a legitimate workflow or potentially malicious activity.
 32- Check the agent.id field to identify the specific host involved in the alert and correlate it with other security events or logs from the same host to gather additional context.
 33- Investigate the @timestamp field to verify the timing of the event and cross-reference with any known scheduled tasks or user activities that could explain the execution.
 34- Analyze the host.os.type field to confirm the operating system and ensure that the alert pertains to a Linux environment, as expected by the rule.
 35
 36### False positive analysis
 37
 38- Routine administrative tasks using file transfer utilities may trigger alerts. Regularly scheduled backups or updates using scp, rsync, or ftp should be documented and excluded from alerts by creating exceptions for known scripts or cron jobs.
 39- Automated system updates or patches that utilize these utilities can be mistaken for suspicious activity. Identify and whitelist the processes and command lines associated with these updates to prevent false positives.
 40- Internal data transfers between trusted servers for legitimate business purposes might be flagged. Establish a list of trusted agent IDs and exclude them from the rule to avoid unnecessary alerts.
 41- Development and testing environments often use these utilities for transferring test data. Ensure that these environments are recognized and excluded by specifying their hostnames or IP addresses in the rule configuration.
 42- User-initiated file transfers for legitimate reasons, such as data analysis or reporting, can be misinterpreted. Educate users to notify the security team of such activities in advance, allowing for temporary exceptions to be made.
 43
 44### Response and remediation
 45
 46- Immediately isolate the affected Linux system from the network to prevent further data exfiltration and unauthorized access.
 47- Terminate any suspicious file transfer processes identified by the alert, such as scp, ftp, or rsync, to halt ongoing data transfers.
 48- Conduct a thorough review of the process command lines and parent executables to identify any malicious scripts or unauthorized software that initiated the file transfer.
 49- Change credentials and access keys associated with the compromised system to prevent further unauthorized access.
 50- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for a deeper forensic analysis to determine the extent of the breach and identify any additional compromised systems.
 51- Implement network monitoring to detect any further attempts of unauthorized file transfers or suspicious activities from the affected system.
 52- Update and enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to improve detection capabilities for similar threats in the future.
 53"""
 54risk_score = 47
 55rule_id = "8eeeda11-dca6-4c3e-910f-7089db412d1c"
 56setup = """## Setup
 57
 58This rule requires data coming in from one of the following integrations:
 59- Elastic Defend
 60
 61### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
 62Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
 63
 64#### Prerequisite Requirements:
 65- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
 66- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
 67
 68#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
 69- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
 70- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
 71- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
 72- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
 73- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
 74- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
 75- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
 76- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
 77For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
 78- Click "Save and Continue".
 79- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
 80For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
 81"""
 82severity = "medium"
 83tags = [
 84    "Domain: Endpoint",
 85    "OS: Linux",
 86    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 87    "Tactic: Exfiltration",
 88    "Tactic: Execution",
 89    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 90    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 91    "Noise: Medium",
 92    "Performance: Normal",
 93    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
 94    "Platform: Linux",
 95]
 96timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 97type = "esql"
 98query = '''
 99from logs-endpoint.events.process-* metadata _id, _index, _version
100| mv_expand event.action 
101| where
102    host.os.type == "linux" and
103    event.type == "start" and
104    event.action == "exec" and
105    process.name in ("scp", "ftp", "sftp", "vsftpd", "sftp-server", "rsync") and (
106        (process.parent.name in ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish")) or
107        (
108          process.parent.name like ".*" or
109          process.parent.name like "*.elf" or
110          process.parent.name like "*.sh" or
111          process.parent.name like "*.py" or
112          process.parent.name like "*.rb" or
113          process.parent.name like "*.pl" or
114          process.parent.name like "*.lua*" or
115          process.parent.name like "*.php*" or
116          process.parent.name like "*.js"
117        ) or
118        (
119          process.parent.executable like "/tmp/*" or
120          process.parent.executable like "/var/tmp/*" or
121          process.parent.executable like "/dev/shm/*" or
122          process.parent.executable like "./*" or
123          process.parent.executable like "/run/*" or
124          process.parent.executable like "/var/run/*" or
125          process.parent.executable like "/boot/*" or
126          process.parent.executable like "/sys/*" or
127          process.parent.executable like "/lost+found/*" or
128          process.parent.executable like "/proc/*" or
129          process.parent.executable like "/var/mail/*" or
130          process.parent.executable like "/var/www/*" or
131          process.parent.executable like "/home/*" or
132          process.parent.executable like "/root/*"
133        )
134    )
135
136| keep
137    @timestamp,
138    _id,
139    _index,
140    _version,
141    host.os.type,
142    event.type,
143    event.action,
144    process.name,
145    process.parent.name,
146    process.parent.executable,
147    process.executable,
148    agent.id,
149    host.name,
150    data_stream.dataset,
151    data_stream.namespace
152
153| stats
154    Esql.event_count = count(),
155    Esql.agent_id_count_distinct = count_distinct(agent.id),
156    Esql.host_name_values = values(host.name),
157    Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id),
158    Esql.data_stream_dataset_values = values(data_stream.dataset),
159    Esql.data_stream_namespace_values = values(data_stream.namespace)
160
161  by process.executable, process.parent.executable
162
163| where
164    Esql.agent_id_count_distinct == 1 and
165    Esql.event_count < 5
166| sort Esql.event_count asc
167
168// Extract unique values to ECS fields for alerts exclusion
169| eval agent.id = mv_min(Esql.agent_id_values),
170       host.name = mv_min(Esql.host_name_values)
171
172| keep agent.id, host.name, process.executable, process.parent.executable, Esql.*
173'''
174
175[[rule.threat]]
176framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
177
178[[rule.threat.technique]]
179id = "T1048"
180name = "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"
181reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/"
182
183[rule.threat.tactic]
184id = "TA0010"
185name = "Exfiltration"
186reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
187
188[[rule.threat]]
189framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
190
191[[rule.threat.technique]]
192id = "T1059"
193name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
194reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
195
196[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
197id = "T1059.004"
198name = "Unix Shell"
199reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
200
201[rule.threat.tactic]
202id = "TA0002"
203name = "Execution"
204reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"