Execution via OpenClaw Agent

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/02/02"
  3integration = ["endpoint"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/09/18"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects suspicious child process execution from the OpenClaw, Moltbot, or Clawdbot AI coding agents running via Node.js.
 11These tools can execute arbitrary shell commands through skills or prompt injection attacks. Malicious skills from
 12public registries like ClawHub have been observed executing obfuscated download-and-execute commands targeting
 13cryptocurrency wallets and credentials. This rule identifies shells, scripting interpreters, and common LOLBins spawned
 14by these AI agents.
 15"""
 16from = "now-9m"
 17index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*"]
 18language = "eql"
 19license = "Elastic License v2"
 20name = "Execution via OpenClaw Agent"
 21note = """## Triage and analysis
 22
 23### Investigating Execution via OpenClaw Agent
 24
 25OpenClaw (formerly Clawdbot, rebranded to Moltbot) is a personal AI coding assistant that can execute shell commands 
 26and scripts on behalf of users. Malicious actors have weaponized the skill ecosystem (ClawHub) to distribute skills 
 27that execute download-and-execute commands, targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.
 28
 29### Possible investigation steps
 30
 31- Verify if OpenClaw/Moltbot is an approved application in your organization.
 32- Review the child process command line for indicators of malicious activity (encoded payloads, remote downloads, credential access).
 33- Check the parent Node.js process command line to identify which OpenClaw component initiated the execution.
 34- Examine recently installed skills from ClawHub for malicious or obfuscated code.
 35- Correlate with network events to identify data exfiltration or C2 communication.
 36- Review the user's AI conversation history for prompt injection attempts.
 37
 38### False positive analysis
 39
 40- Developers legitimately using OpenClaw/Moltbot for AI-assisted coding may trigger this rule when the AI executes build scripts, curl commands, or other legitimate automation.
 41- If the tool is approved, consider tuning based on specific command patterns or adding exception lists.
 42
 43### Response and remediation
 44
 45- If the child process activity appears malicious, terminate the OpenClaw gateway and investigate the skill that initiated the command.
 46- Review and remove any suspicious skills from the OpenClaw configuration.
 47- If credentials may have been accessed, rotate affected secrets and API keys.
 48- Block known typosquat domains (moltbot.you, clawbot.ai, clawdbot.you) at the network level.
 49"""
 50references = [
 51    "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/01/clawdbots-rename-to-moltbot-sparks-impersonation-campaign",
 52    "https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/malicious-moltbot-skill-targets-crypto-users-on-clawhub",
 53    "https://blogs.cisco.com/ai/personal-ai-agents-like-openclaw-are-a-security-nightmare",
 54    "https://blog.virustotal.com/2026/02/from-automation-to-infection-how.html",
 55]
 56risk_score = 47
 57rule_id = "a7c3e8f2-4b19-4d6a-9e5c-8f1a2b3c4d5e"
 58severity = "medium"
 59tags = [
 60    "Domain: Endpoint",
 61    "Domain: LLM",
 62    "OS: Linux",
 63    "OS: macOS",
 64    "OS: Windows",
 65    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 66    "Tactic: Execution",
 67    "Tactic: Command and Control",
 68    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 69    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 70    "Noise: High",
 71    "Performance: Normal",
 72    "Profile: Aggressive",
 73    "Threat: Living off the Land",
 74    "Rule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)",
 75    "Platform: Windows",
 76    "Platform: Linux",
 77    "Platform: macOS",
 78    "Domain: GenAI",
 79]
 80timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 81type = "eql"
 82
 83query = '''
 84process where event.type == "start" and
 85  process.parent.name : ("node", "node.exe") and 
 86  process.parent.command_line : ("*openclaw*", "*moltbot*", "*clawdbot*") and
 87   process.name : ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "bash.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "curl.exe", "curl", "base64", "xattr", "osascript", "python*", "chmod", "certutil.exe", "rundll32.exe") and
 88   not process.args in (
 89     "ip neigh show",
 90     "arp -a -n -l",
 91     "ip neighbor show dev wlan0",
 92     "ip neighbor show dev eth0",
 93     "arp -a | findstr /C:---"
 94   )
 95'''
 96
 97
 98[[rule.threat]]
 99framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
100
101[[rule.threat.technique]]
102id = "T1059"
103name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
104reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
105
106[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
107id = "T1059.001"
108name = "PowerShell"
109reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
110
111[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
112id = "T1059.002"
113name = "AppleScript"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002/"
115
116[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
117id = "T1059.003"
118name = "Windows Command Shell"
119reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
120
121[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
122id = "T1059.004"
123name = "Unix Shell"
124reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
125
126[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
127id = "T1059.006"
128name = "Python"
129reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"
130
131[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
132id = "T1059.007"
133name = "JavaScript"
134reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"
135
136[rule.threat.tactic]
137id = "TA0002"
138name = "Execution"
139reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
140
141[[rule.threat]]
142framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
143
144[[rule.threat.technique]]
145id = "T1071"
146name = "Application Layer Protocol"
147reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
148
149[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
150id = "T1071.001"
151name = "Web Protocols"
152reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"
153
154[[rule.threat.technique]]
155id = "T1105"
156name = "Ingress Tool Transfer"
157reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/"
158
159[rule.threat.tactic]
160id = "TA0011"
161name = "Command and Control"
162reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
163
164[[rule.threat]]
165framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
166
167[[rule.threat.technique]]
168id = "T1140"
169name = "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"
170reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/"
171
172[[rule.threat.technique]]
173id = "T1218"
174name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
175reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
176
177[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
178id = "T1218.011"
179name = "Rundll32"
180reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"
181
182[rule.threat.tactic]
183id = "TA0005"
184name = "Defense Evasion"
185reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"