GCP Vertex AI Prompt or Response Containing Credentials
Detects a GCP Vertex AI GenerateContent exchange whose prompt or model reply contains a known credential pattern (AWS access keys, GitHub tokens, PEM private keys, and similar), or whose assistant reply warns about exposed keys and revocation. Secrets in prompt/response logs are visible to anyone with access to BigQuery prompt-response export and Elastic.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/10/02"
3integration = ["gcp_vertexai"]
4maturity = "production"
5min_stack_comments = "gcp_vertexai prompt_response_logs requires integration 1.4.0+ (Kibana ^9.2.0)."
6min_stack_version = "9.4.0"
7updated_date = "2026/11/06"
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Detects a GCP Vertex AI GenerateContent exchange whose prompt or model reply contains a known credential pattern (AWS
13access keys, GitHub tokens, PEM private keys, and similar), or whose assistant reply warns about exposed keys and
14revocation. Secrets in prompt/response logs are visible to anyone with access to BigQuery prompt-response export and
15Elastic.
16"""
17false_positives = [
18 """
19 Documentation and unit tests that paste example keys (for example an AWS access key ending in EXAMPLE) match the
20 token patterns. Confirm the value is live before rotating it.
21 """,
22]
23from = "now-60m"
24interval = "10m"
25language = "esql"
26license = "Elastic License v2"
27name = "GCP Vertex AI Prompt or Response Containing Credentials"
28note = """## Triage and analysis
29
30### Investigating GCP Vertex AI Prompt or Response Containing Credentials
31
32A Vertex AI prompt-response log row matched a credential pattern in the user prompt and/or model
33reply (AWS access keys, GitHub tokens, PEM private keys, Slack tokens, Stripe live keys, Google API
34keys, or GitLab PATs). There is no provider-side credential flag — the match is content-only.
35Secrets in these logs are visible to anyone with access to the BigQuery export and Elastic.
36
37#### Possible investigation steps
38
39- Read `gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_request.contents.parts.text` and
40 `...full_response.candidates.content.parts.text` on the alert. Decide whether the match is a live
41 secret or an example/placeholder (for example an AWS key ending in `EXAMPLE`).
42- Note `gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.model`, `api_method`, and `@timestamp`.
43- Correlate with `logs-gcp_vertexai.auditlogs-*` GenerateContent events in the same window for
44 `source.ip` and `client.user.email` to identify the calling principal and application egress.
45- If the secret appears in the model reply, treat it as completion exposure as well as prompt
46 exposure; review whether the prompt asked the model to recall or transform secrets.
47- Scope impact: which system the credential belongs to and what privileges it has.
48
49### False positive analysis
50
51- Documentation, unit tests, and tutorials that paste example keys match the same prefixes. Confirm
52 the value is live before rotating or paging.
53
54### Response and remediation
55
56- If the credential is live: rotate or revoke it immediately and hunt for use of that secret outside
57 Vertex (CloudTrail, GitHub audit, IdP, etc.).
58- Find and fix the application path that placed the secret in the prompt; add input/output filtering
59 (Model Armor / sensitive-data policies) so secrets are not logged again.
60"""
61references = [
62 "https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/gcp_vertexai",
63 "https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm06-sensitive-information-disclosure",
64]
65risk_score = 73
66rule_id = "4a1683ef-7f20-4c2a-bfa6-6eb7c3dc03d3"
67setup = """## Setup
68
69Requires the GCP Vertex AI integration collecting `prompt_response_logs` from BigQuery request/response logging.
70
71https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/gcp_vertexai
72"""
73severity = "high"
74tags = [
75 "Domain: GenAI",
76 "Domain: Cloud",
77 "Data Source: GCP Vertex AI",
78 "Data Source: GCP",
79 "Data Source: Google Cloud Platform",
80 "Platform: GCP",
81 "Service: GCP Vertex AI",
82 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
83 "Tactic: Credential Access",
84 "Threat: LLMjacking",
85 "Threat: Unauthorized AI Usage",
86 "Mitre Atlas: AML.T0055",
87 "Mitre Atlas: AML.T0057",
88 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
89 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
90]
91timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
92type = "esql"
93
94query = '''
95from logs-gcp_vertexai.prompt_response_logs-* metadata _id, _version, _index
96| where data_stream.dataset == "gcp_vertexai.prompt_response_logs"
97| eval request_text = coalesce(mv_concat(gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_request.contents.parts.text, " "), ""),
98 response_raw = coalesce(mv_concat(gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.candidates.content.parts.text, " "), ""),
99 response_text = to_lower(response_raw)
100| where
101 request_text rlike """.*(AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}.*""" or
102 response_raw rlike """.*(AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}.*""" or
103 request_text rlike """.*gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}.*""" or
104 response_raw rlike """.*gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}.*""" or
105 request_text rlike """.*github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
106 response_raw rlike """.*github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
107 request_text rlike """.*-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*""" or
108 response_raw rlike """.*-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*""" or
109 request_text rlike """.*xox[baprs]-[0-9]+-[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]+.*""" or
110 response_raw rlike """.*xox[baprs]-[0-9]+-[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]+.*""" or
111 request_text rlike """.*sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]+.*""" or
112 response_raw rlike """.*sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]+.*""" or
113 request_text rlike """.*AIza[-A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
114 response_raw rlike """.*AIza[-A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
115 request_text rlike """.*glpat-[-A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
116 response_raw rlike """.*glpat-[-A-Za-z0-9_]+.*""" or
117 response_text like "*serious security concern*" or
118 response_text like "*exposing api keys*" or
119 response_text like "*revoke/delete the api key*"
120| keep
121 _id,
122 _version,
123 _index,
124 @timestamp,
125 cloud.project.id,
126 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.model,
127 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.api_method,
128 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_request.contents.parts.text,
129 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.candidates.content.parts.text,
130 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.candidates.finish_reason,
131 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.usage_metadata.prompt_token_count,
132 gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.usage_metadata.candidates_token_count
133'''
134
135
136[[rule.threat]]
137framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
138[[rule.threat.technique]]
139id = "T1552"
140name = "Unsecured Credentials"
141reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
142
143
144[rule.threat.tactic]
145id = "TA0006"
146name = "Credential Access"
147reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
148[[rule.threat_mappings]]
149framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
150version = "2026.08"
151[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
152framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
153[[rule.threat_mappings.threat.technique]]
154id = "AML.T0057"
155name = "LLM Data Leakage"
156reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0057/"
157
158
159[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
160id = "AML.TA0010"
161name = "Exfiltration"
162reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0010/"
163[[rule.threat_mappings.threat]]
164framework = "MITRE ATLAS"
165[[rule.threat_mappings.threat.technique]]
166id = "AML.T0055"
167name = "Unsecured Credentials"
168reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0055/"
169
170
171[rule.threat_mappings.threat.tactic]
172id = "AML.TA0013"
173name = "Credential Access"
174reference = "https://atlas.mitre.org/tactics/AML.TA0013/"
175
176[rule.investigation_fields]
177field_names = [
178 "cloud.project.id",
179 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.model",
180 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.api_method",
181 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_request.contents.parts.text",
182 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.candidates.content.parts.text",
183 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.candidates.finish_reason",
184 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.usage_metadata.prompt_token_count",
185 "gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_response.usage_metadata.candidates_token_count",
186]
Triage and analysis
Investigating GCP Vertex AI Prompt or Response Containing Credentials
A Vertex AI prompt-response log row matched a credential pattern in the user prompt and/or model reply (AWS access keys, GitHub tokens, PEM private keys, Slack tokens, Stripe live keys, Google API keys, or GitLab PATs). There is no provider-side credential flag — the match is content-only. Secrets in these logs are visible to anyone with access to the BigQuery export and Elastic.
Possible investigation steps
- Read
gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.full_request.contents.parts.textand...full_response.candidates.content.parts.texton the alert. Decide whether the match is a live secret or an example/placeholder (for example an AWS key ending inEXAMPLE). - Note
gcp.vertexai.prompt_response_logs.model,api_method, and@timestamp. - Correlate with
logs-gcp_vertexai.auditlogs-*GenerateContent events in the same window forsource.ipandclient.user.emailto identify the calling principal and application egress. - If the secret appears in the model reply, treat it as completion exposure as well as prompt exposure; review whether the prompt asked the model to recall or transform secrets.
- Scope impact: which system the credential belongs to and what privileges it has.
False positive analysis
- Documentation, unit tests, and tutorials that paste example keys match the same prefixes. Confirm the value is live before rotating or paging.
Response and remediation
- If the credential is live: rotate or revoke it immediately and hunt for use of that secret outside Vertex (CloudTrail, GitHub audit, IdP, etc.).
- Find and fix the application path that placed the secret in the prompt; add input/output filtering (Model Armor / sensitive-data policies) so secrets are not logged again.
References
Related rules
- GCP Vertex AI Caller Activity From High Number of Countries
- GCP Vertex AI Caller Impossible Travel
- GCP Vertex AI High Request and Token Volume
- GCP Vertex AI High GenerateContent Volume From Single IP
- GCP Vertex AI Jailbreak Prompt Heuristics