GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User
Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, a principal creates a snapshot of a Compute Engine persistent disk (".compute.disks.createSnapshot", ".compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot", or "*.compute.snapshots.insert"). Adversaries create disk snapshots to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled project without reading the source VM directly. This is a New Terms rule keyed on the project and acting principal, excluding known cloud-provider egress networks.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/11/12"
3integration = ["gcp"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/11/12"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, a principal creates a snapshot of a Compute Engine persistent disk
11("*.compute.disks.createSnapshot", "*.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot", or "*.compute.snapshots.insert"). Adversaries
12create disk snapshots to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled project
13without reading the source VM directly. This is a New Terms rule keyed on the project and acting principal, excluding
14known cloud-provider egress networks.
15"""
16false_positives = [
17 """
18 Backup, disaster-recovery, and image-automation service accounts create snapshots routinely. Baseline known
19 automation principals by user.email and add exceptions; interactive or first-seen snapshot creation warrants review.
20 """,
21]
22from = "now-6m"
23index = ["logs-gcp.audit-*"]
24language = "kuery"
25license = "Elastic License v2"
26name = "GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User"
27note = """## Triage and analysis
28
29> **Disclaimer**:
30> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
31
32### Investigating GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User
33
34GCP persistent-disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of a zonal or regional disk created via `*.compute.disks.createSnapshot`, `*.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot`, or `*.compute.snapshots.insert`. Adversaries snapshot a target disk and then copy or share it to an attacker-controlled project, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.
35
36### Possible investigation steps
37
38- Identify the acting principal (`user.email`) and whether snapshot creation (`event.action`) is expected for it.
39- Review the target resource (`gcp.audit.resource_name`) and request parameters to identify the source disk and whether it holds sensitive data.
40- Review `source.ip` and `source.as.organization.name`; confirm the operation aligns with normal egress.
41- Correlate with follow-on snapshot copy/share or image creation in the same project or across projects.
42
43### False positive analysis
44
45- Backup/DR and image-bake automation; baseline those service-account principals and add exceptions by `user.email`.
46
47### Response and remediation
48
49- If unexpected, review any snapshot copy/share, revoke cross-project access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on `compute.disks.createSnapshot` and `compute.snapshots.create`.
50"""
51references = [
52 "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/create-snapshots",
53 "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.md",
54]
55risk_score = 21
56rule_id = "ddf5265a-9b04-4d5c-9d28-12cbfed37136"
57severity = "low"
58tags = [
59 "Domain: Cloud",
60 "Platform: GCP",
61 "Data Source: GCP",
62 "Data Source: Google Cloud Platform",
63 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
64 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
65 "Rule Type: New Terms",
66 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
67]
68timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
69type = "new_terms"
70
71query = '''
72data_stream.dataset: "gcp.audit"
73 and event.action: (
74 *.compute.disks.createSnapshot or *.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot or *.compute.snapshots.insert
75 )
76 and not event.outcome: "failure"
77 and cloud.project.id: *
78 and user.email: *
79 and not source.as.organization.name: (
80 "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
81 or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
82 )
83'''
84
85
86[[rule.threat]]
87framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
88[[rule.threat.technique]]
89id = "T1578"
90name = "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"
91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/"
92[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
93id = "T1578.001"
94name = "Create Snapshot"
95reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001/"
96
97
98
99[rule.threat.tactic]
100id = "TA0005"
101name = "Defense Evasion"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
103
104[rule.investigation_fields]
105field_names = [
106 "@timestamp",
107 "user.email",
108 "source.ip",
109 "source.as.organization.name",
110 "gcp.audit.resource_name",
111 "event.action",
112 "event.outcome",
113 "cloud.project.id",
114]
115
116[rule.new_terms]
117field = "new_terms_fields"
118value = ["cloud.project.id", "user.email"]
119[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
120field = "history_window_start"
121value = "now-10d"
Triage and analysis
Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
Investigating GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User
GCP persistent-disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of a zonal or regional disk created via *.compute.disks.createSnapshot, *.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot, or *.compute.snapshots.insert. Adversaries snapshot a target disk and then copy or share it to an attacker-controlled project, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify the acting principal (
user.email) and whether snapshot creation (event.action) is expected for it. - Review the target resource (
gcp.audit.resource_name) and request parameters to identify the source disk and whether it holds sensitive data. - Review
source.ipandsource.as.organization.name; confirm the operation aligns with normal egress. - Correlate with follow-on snapshot copy/share or image creation in the same project or across projects.
False positive analysis
- Backup/DR and image-bake automation; baseline those service-account principals and add exceptions by
user.email.
Response and remediation
- If unexpected, review any snapshot copy/share, revoke cross-project access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on
compute.disks.createSnapshotandcompute.snapshots.create.
References
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