Scheduled Job Creation via At Utility Inside a Container

This rule detects execution of the "at" or "atd" job-scheduling utilities inside a Linux container. Containers are typically immutable, single-purpose, and do not run interactive job schedulers, so the use of "at" to queue a one-time command is anomalous. Adversaries abuse "at" to establish persistence or to execute a payload at a later time after gaining a foothold inside a container.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/11/13"
  3integration = ["cloud_defend"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5min_stack_comments = "Defend for Containers integration was re-introduced in 9.3.0"
  6min_stack_version = "9.3.0"
  7updated_date = "2026/11/13"
  8
  9[rule]
 10author = ["Elastic"]
 11description = """
 12This rule detects execution of the "at" or "atd" job-scheduling utilities inside a Linux container. Containers are
 13typically immutable, single-purpose, and do not run interactive job schedulers, so the use of "at" to queue a one-time
 14command is anomalous. Adversaries abuse "at" to establish persistence or to execute a payload at a later time after
 15gaining a foothold inside a container.
 16"""
 17false_positives = [
 18    """
 19    Some container images bundle the "at"/"atd" utilities and a small number of workloads may legitimately schedule
 20    one-time jobs. Investigate the queued command and the scheduling principal; baseline and except known automation
 21    images where appropriate.
 22    """,
 23]
 24from = "now-6m"
 25interval = "5m"
 26language = "esql"
 27license = "Elastic License v2"
 28name = "Scheduled Job Creation via At Utility Inside a Container"
 29note = """## Setup
 30
 31This rule requires the Elastic Defend for Containers integration to be configured to collect container process events.
 32
 33## Triage and analysis
 34
 35### Investigating Scheduled Job Creation via At Utility Inside a Container
 36
 37The "at" utility schedules a command to run once at a later time via the "atd" daemon. Inside a container this is rarely legitimate: container workloads are usually immutable and process-bound, with scheduling handled by the orchestrator (CronJobs), not an in-container scheduler. Adversaries use "at" to persist or to defer execution of a payload after compromising a container.
 38
 39### Possible investigation steps
 40
 41- Identify the container (`container.id`, `container.name`) and namespace (`orchestrator.namespace`) where "at" executed, and confirm whether in-container scheduling is expected for that workload.
 42- Review the parent process (`process.parent.name`, `process.parent.executable`) to determine whether the invocation came from an interactive shell or an automated process.
 43- Inspect the command that was queued (review the container's `/var/spool/cron/atjobs` or `atq`/`at -c` output) to understand what will run and when.
 44- Correlate with prior activity in the same container, such as tool installation, package manager use, or shell access.
 45
 46### False positive analysis
 47
 48- A small number of images legitimately run "atd" and may schedule maintenance jobs. Baseline these images or namespaces and add exceptions.
 49
 50### Response and remediation
 51
 52- If unexpected, isolate the container, remove the scheduled job (`at -r`), capture the queued command for analysis, and redeploy the workload from a trusted image.
 53- Rotate any credentials exposed to the container and review how the attacker gained execution inside it.
 54"""
 55references = [
 56    "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/",
 57    "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.002/T1053.002.md",
 58]
 59risk_score = 21
 60rule_id = "1a263a5f-8aea-4c42-a121-0defc82e0a2e"
 61severity = "low"
 62tags = [
 63    "Data Source: Elastic Defend for Containers",
 64    "Domain: Containers",
 65    "OS: Linux",
 66    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 67    "Tactic: Execution",
 68    "Tactic: Persistence",
 69    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 70    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
 71    "Platform: Linux",
 72    "Platform: Kubernetes",
 73]
 74timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 75type = "esql"
 76
 77query = '''
 78from logs-cloud_defend.process* metadata _id, _index, _version
 79| where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
 80    container.id like "*" and
 81    (
 82      process.name in ("at", "atd") or
 83      kql("""process.args: "at" """)
 84    )
 85| keep @timestamp, host.id, container.id, process.name, process.args, process.parent.name, process.parent.executable, user.id, _id, _index, _version
 86'''
 87
 88
 89[[rule.threat]]
 90framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 91[[rule.threat.technique]]
 92id = "T1053"
 93name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
 94reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
 95[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 96id = "T1053.002"
 97name = "At"
 98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/"
 99
100
101
102[rule.threat.tactic]
103id = "TA0002"
104name = "Execution"
105reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
106[[rule.threat]]
107framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
108[[rule.threat.technique]]
109id = "T1053"
110name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
111reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
112[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
113id = "T1053.002"
114name = "At"
115reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002/"
116
117
118
119[rule.threat.tactic]
120id = "TA0003"
121name = "Persistence"
122reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

Setup

This rule requires the Elastic Defend for Containers integration to be configured to collect container process events.

Triage and analysis

Investigating Scheduled Job Creation via At Utility Inside a Container

The "at" utility schedules a command to run once at a later time via the "atd" daemon. Inside a container this is rarely legitimate: container workloads are usually immutable and process-bound, with scheduling handled by the orchestrator (CronJobs), not an in-container scheduler. Adversaries use "at" to persist or to defer execution of a payload after compromising a container.

Possible investigation steps

  • Identify the container (container.id, container.name) and namespace (orchestrator.namespace) where "at" executed, and confirm whether in-container scheduling is expected for that workload.
  • Review the parent process (process.parent.name, process.parent.executable) to determine whether the invocation came from an interactive shell or an automated process.
  • Inspect the command that was queued (review the container's /var/spool/cron/atjobs or atq/at -c output) to understand what will run and when.
  • Correlate with prior activity in the same container, such as tool installation, package manager use, or shell access.

False positive analysis

  • A small number of images legitimately run "atd" and may schedule maintenance jobs. Baseline these images or namespaces and add exceptions.

Response and remediation

  • If unexpected, isolate the container, remove the scheduled job (at -r), capture the queued command for analysis, and redeploy the workload from a trusted image.
  • Rotate any credentials exposed to the container and review how the attacker gained execution inside it.

References

Related rules

to-top