Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/07/09"
  3integration = ["azure"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/07/09"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects an AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) identity establishing an exec session into a pod. Interactive command
 11execution inside a workload via kubectl exec is a common post-compromise technique used to access secrets, run tooling,
 12and expand access from a foothold container. Node, control-plane, and kube-system service account identities are
 13excluded, so workload service accounts and users, the identities an adversary is most likely to abuse, remain in scope.
 14"""
 15false_positives = [
 16    """
 17    Administrators routinely exec into pods for troubleshooting. Baseline expected users and target pods, then exclude
 18    known break-glass or operator identities after review.
 19    """,
 20]
 21from = "now-9m"
 22index = ["logs-azure.platformlogs-*"]
 23language = "kuery"
 24license = "Elastic License v2"
 25name = "Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod"
 26note = """## Triage and analysis
 27
 28### Investigating Azure AKS Attempted User Exec into Pod
 29
 30AKS kube-audit events are carried under the flattened `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.*` subtree and share the ARM
 31operation `event.action: Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read`. This rule alerts on a
 32`pods/exec` request by an identity that is not node, control-plane, or kube-system infrastructure. Exec into a pod grants
 33an interactive shell inside the workload, which adversaries use to read mounted secrets, pivot, and stage tooling.
 34
 35### Possible investigation steps
 36
 37- Review the acting identity in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username` and its groups in
 38  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.groups`, and the target pod in
 39  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.name` / `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.namespace`.
 40- Determine whether the target pod holds sensitive data, cluster credentials, or a mounted service account token.
 41- Inspect the exec request path and command context in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.requestURI` and the client in
 42  `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.userAgent` (interactive `kubectl` vs a scripted client).
 43- Evaluate the source in `azure.platformlogs.properties.log.sourceIPs`. Pivot on it for related API activity, secret
 44  reads, or RBAC changes from the same identity.
 45
 46### False positive analysis
 47
 48- Approved admin debugging; exclude stable operator or break-glass identities after review.
 49- CI/CD or platform tooling that execs into workloads may match; exclude verified service accounts and namespaces.
 50
 51### Response and remediation
 52
 53- If unauthorized, revoke the identity's tokens and kubeconfig and terminate the exec session.
 54- Inspect the target pod for tampering, dropped tooling, or accessed secrets, and rotate any credentials it exposed.
 55- Collect kube-audit and identity artifacts per incident response procedures.
 56"""
 57references = [
 58    "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/debug/debug-application/get-shell-running-container/",
 59    "https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/",
 60    "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/",
 61]
 62risk_score = 47
 63rule_id = "8f131efa-0284-465f-a360-da23e5562dd1"
 64setup = "The Azure Fleet integration collecting AKS diagnostic logs with the `kube-audit` category forwarded through Event Hub into the `azure.platformlogs` data stream is required for this rule."
 65severity = "medium"
 66tags = [
 67    "Domain: Cloud",
 68    "Domain: Kubernetes",
 69    "Data Source: Azure",
 70    "Data Source: Azure Platform Logs",
 71    "Data Source: Kubernetes",
 72    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 73    "Tactic: Execution",
 74    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 75]
 76timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 77type = "query"
 78
 79query = '''
 80data_stream.dataset:azure.platformlogs and
 81  event.action:"Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read" and
 82  azure.platformlogs.category:"kube-audit" and
 83  azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.resource:"pods" and azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.subresource:"exec" and
 84  azure.platformlogs.properties.log.verb:("create" or "get") and
 85  not azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username:(
 86    system\:node\:* or "aksService" or "hcpService" or "readinessChecker" or
 87    system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*
 88  )
 89'''
 90
 91
 92[[rule.threat]]
 93framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 94[[rule.threat.technique]]
 95id = "T1609"
 96name = "Container Administration Command"
 97reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1609/"
 98
 99
100[rule.threat.tactic]
101id = "TA0002"
102name = "Execution"
103reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
104
105[rule.investigation_fields]
106field_names = [
107    "@timestamp",
108    "event.action",
109    "azure.platformlogs.category",
110    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.verb",
111    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.user.username",
112    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.sourceIPs",
113    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.resource",
114    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.subresource",
115    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.namespace",
116    "azure.platformlogs.properties.log.objectRef.name"
117]