Azure Compute Snapshot Created by Unusual Source ASN

Identifies the creation of an Azure managed-disk snapshot ("Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write"). Adversaries create snapshots of disks to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled scope without reading the source VM directly. This ES|QL rule normalizes the acting identity across user- and service-principal-initiated operations and excludes known cloud-provider egress networks.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2026/11/12"
 3integration = ["azure"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2026/11/12"
 6
 7[rule]
 8author = ["Elastic"]
 9description = """
10Identifies the creation of an Azure managed-disk snapshot ("Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/write"). Adversaries create
11snapshots of disks to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled scope
12without reading the source VM directly. This ES|QL rule normalizes the acting identity across user- and
13service-principal-initiated operations and excludes known cloud-provider egress networks.
14"""
15from = "now-10m"
16interval = "5m"
17language = "esql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Azure Compute Snapshot Created by Unusual Source ASN"
20note = """## Triage and analysis
21
22> **Disclaimer**:
23> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
24
25### Investigating Azure Compute Snapshot Created by Unusual Source ASN
26
27Azure disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of managed disks. Adversaries create a snapshot of a target disk and then share or copy it to an attacker-controlled subscription or storage, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.
28
29### Possible investigation steps
30
31- Identify the actor (`Esql.actor`) and whether snapshot creation is expected for that principal.
32- Review the target disk/snapshot (`azure.resource.name`) and whether it holds sensitive data.
33- Review `source.as.organization.name` and the source IP for the operation; confirm it aligns with normal egress.
34- Correlate with follow-on `Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/beginGetAccess/action` (SAS export), `CopySnapshot`, or snapshot sharing in the same window.
35
36### False positive analysis
37
38- Backup, disaster-recovery, and image-bake automation create snapshots routinely; baseline known automation identities and add exceptions.
39
40### Response and remediation
41
42- If unexpected, revoke any snapshot SAS/export access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on `Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/*`.
43"""
44references = [
45    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/snapshot-copy-managed-disk",
46    "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.md",
47    "https://www.cyngular.com/blog/beyond-the-backup-the-hidden-dangers-of-azure-snapshot-exfiltration"
48]
49risk_score = 21
50rule_id = "5505f93b-3f3d-4986-89c6-0ade2aa5db94"
51severity = "low"
52tags = [
53    "Domain: Cloud",
54    "Data Source: Azure",
55    "Data Source: Azure Activity Logs",
56    "Platform: Azure",
57    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
58    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
59    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
60]
61timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
62type = "esql"
63
64query = '''
65FROM logs-azure.activitylogs-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
66| WHERE event.dataset == "azure.activitylogs"
67    AND event.action == "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/SNAPSHOTS/WRITE"
68    AND event.outcome == "success"
69    AND NOT COALESCE(source.as.organization.name, "none") IN
70        ("Google LLC", "Amazon.com, Inc.", "Microsoft Corporation", "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM",
71         "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK", "AMAZON-AES", "AMAZON-02")
72| EVAL Esql.actor = COALESCE(user.name, azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id)
73| KEEP _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, Esql.actor, cloud.account.id, azure.resource.name, source.as.organization.name, event.action
74'''
75
76
77[[rule.threat]]
78framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
79[[rule.threat.technique]]
80id = "T1578"
81name = "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"
82reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/"
83[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
84id = "T1578.001"
85name = "Create Snapshot"
86reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001/"
87
88
89[rule.threat.tactic]
90id = "TA0005"
91name = "Defense Evasion"
92reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

Triage and analysis

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

Investigating Azure Compute Snapshot Created by Unusual Source ASN

Azure disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of managed disks. Adversaries create a snapshot of a target disk and then share or copy it to an attacker-controlled subscription or storage, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.

Possible investigation steps

  • Identify the actor (Esql.actor) and whether snapshot creation is expected for that principal.
  • Review the target disk/snapshot (azure.resource.name) and whether it holds sensitive data.
  • Review source.as.organization.name and the source IP for the operation; confirm it aligns with normal egress.
  • Correlate with follow-on Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/beginGetAccess/action (SAS export), CopySnapshot, or snapshot sharing in the same window.

False positive analysis

  • Backup, disaster-recovery, and image-bake automation create snapshots routinely; baseline known automation identities and add exceptions.

Response and remediation

  • If unexpected, revoke any snapshot SAS/export access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on Microsoft.Compute/snapshots/*.

References

Related rules

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