Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted

Identifies the deletion of an Azure Event Hub namespace ("Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/delete"). Event Hub namespaces are a common egress path for Azure diagnostic, activity, and sign-in logs to SIEMs, deleting a namespace can sever that telemetry pipeline, impairing defenses and monitoring. This rule excludes known cloud-provider egress networks to reduce infrastructure-automation noise.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/11/12"
  3integration = ["azure"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/11/12"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies the deletion of an Azure Event Hub namespace ("Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/delete"). Event Hub namespaces
 11are a common egress path for Azure diagnostic, activity, and sign-in logs to SIEMs, deleting a namespace can sever that
 12telemetry pipeline, impairing defenses and monitoring. This rule excludes known cloud-provider egress networks to reduce
 13infrastructure-automation noise.
 14"""
 15false_positives = [
 16    """
 17    Infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD automation (e.g. crossplane, Terraform) create and delete ephemeral Event Hub
 18    namespaces. Baseline known automation principals and source networks; interactive deletion of a logging namespace
 19    warrants review.
 20    """,
 21]
 22from = "now-9m"
 23index = ["logs-azure.activitylogs-*"]
 24language = "kuery"
 25license = "Elastic License v2"
 26name = "Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted"
 27note = """## Triage and analysis
 28
 29### Investigating Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted
 30
 31Event Hub namespaces frequently carry diagnostic/activity/sign-in log egress to monitoring pipelines. Deleting one can blind detection by cutting off that telemetry, and may precede or accompany other malicious activity.
 32
 33### Possible investigation steps
 34
 35- Identify the deleted namespace (`azure.resource.name`) and whether it was a logging/diagnostics egress hub.
 36- Identify the acting principal (`azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id`) and whether the deletion was expected.
 37- Review `source.as.organization.name` and source IP; confirm it aligns with normal administration.
 38- Check diagnostic settings that targeted the namespace and whether log egress stopped after the deletion.
 39
 40### False positive analysis
 41
 42- CI/CD pipelines routinely create and delete ephemeral namespaces; baseline those principals and networks.
 43
 44### Response and remediation
 45
 46- If unexpected, restore diagnostic settings to a healthy egress target, verify log ingestion resumed, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on `Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/*`.
 47"""
 48references = [
 49    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/event-hubs-about",
 50    "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1685.002/T1685.002.md",
 51]
 52risk_score = 47
 53rule_id = "8b62b3c1-77d6-4f66-9b5a-bf1ebbac8922"
 54severity = "medium"
 55tags = [
 56    "Domain: Cloud",
 57    "Data Source: Azure",
 58    "Data Source: Azure Activity Logs",
 59    "Platform: Azure",
 60    "Use Case: Log Auditing",
 61    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
 62    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 63]
 64timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 65type = "query"
 66
 67query = '''
 68data_stream.dataset: "azure.activitylogs"
 69    and event.action: "MICROSOFT.EVENTHUB/NAMESPACES/DELETE"
 70    and event.outcome: "success"
 71    and not source.as.organization.name: (
 72        "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
 73        or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
 74    )
 75'''
 76
 77
 78[[rule.threat]]
 79framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 80[[rule.threat.technique]]
 81id = "T1562"
 82name = "Impair Defenses"
 83reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
 84[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 85id = "T1562.008"
 86name = "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"
 87reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/"
 88
 89
 90[rule.threat.tactic]
 91id = "TA0005"
 92name = "Defense Evasion"
 93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
 94
 95[rule.investigation_fields]
 96field_names = [
 97    "@timestamp",
 98    "azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id",
 99    "azure.resource.name",
100    "azure.resource.group",
101    "source.ip",
102    "source.as.organization.name",
103    "event.action",
104    "event.outcome",
105    "cloud.account.id",
106]

Triage and analysis

Investigating Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted

Event Hub namespaces frequently carry diagnostic/activity/sign-in log egress to monitoring pipelines. Deleting one can blind detection by cutting off that telemetry, and may precede or accompany other malicious activity.

Possible investigation steps

  • Identify the deleted namespace (azure.resource.name) and whether it was a logging/diagnostics egress hub.
  • Identify the acting principal (azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id) and whether the deletion was expected.
  • Review source.as.organization.name and source IP; confirm it aligns with normal administration.
  • Check diagnostic settings that targeted the namespace and whether log egress stopped after the deletion.

False positive analysis

  • CI/CD pipelines routinely create and delete ephemeral namespaces; baseline those principals and networks.

Response and remediation

  • If unexpected, restore diagnostic settings to a healthy egress target, verify log ingestion resumed, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/*.

References

Related rules

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