Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted
Identifies the deletion of an Azure Event Hub namespace ("Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/delete"). Event Hub namespaces are a common egress path for Azure diagnostic, activity, and sign-in logs to SIEMs, deleting a namespace can sever that telemetry pipeline, impairing defenses and monitoring. This rule excludes known cloud-provider egress networks to reduce infrastructure-automation noise.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/11/12"
3integration = ["azure"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/11/12"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies the deletion of an Azure Event Hub namespace ("Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/delete"). Event Hub namespaces
11are a common egress path for Azure diagnostic, activity, and sign-in logs to SIEMs, deleting a namespace can sever that
12telemetry pipeline, impairing defenses and monitoring. This rule excludes known cloud-provider egress networks to reduce
13infrastructure-automation noise.
14"""
15false_positives = [
16 """
17 Infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD automation (e.g. crossplane, Terraform) create and delete ephemeral Event Hub
18 namespaces. Baseline known automation principals and source networks; interactive deletion of a logging namespace
19 warrants review.
20 """,
21]
22from = "now-9m"
23index = ["logs-azure.activitylogs-*"]
24language = "kuery"
25license = "Elastic License v2"
26name = "Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted"
27note = """## Triage and analysis
28
29### Investigating Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted
30
31Event Hub namespaces frequently carry diagnostic/activity/sign-in log egress to monitoring pipelines. Deleting one can blind detection by cutting off that telemetry, and may precede or accompany other malicious activity.
32
33### Possible investigation steps
34
35- Identify the deleted namespace (`azure.resource.name`) and whether it was a logging/diagnostics egress hub.
36- Identify the acting principal (`azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id`) and whether the deletion was expected.
37- Review `source.as.organization.name` and source IP; confirm it aligns with normal administration.
38- Check diagnostic settings that targeted the namespace and whether log egress stopped after the deletion.
39
40### False positive analysis
41
42- CI/CD pipelines routinely create and delete ephemeral namespaces; baseline those principals and networks.
43
44### Response and remediation
45
46- If unexpected, restore diagnostic settings to a healthy egress target, verify log ingestion resumed, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on `Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/*`.
47"""
48references = [
49 "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/event-hubs/event-hubs-about",
50 "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1685.002/T1685.002.md",
51]
52risk_score = 47
53rule_id = "8b62b3c1-77d6-4f66-9b5a-bf1ebbac8922"
54severity = "medium"
55tags = [
56 "Domain: Cloud",
57 "Data Source: Azure",
58 "Data Source: Azure Activity Logs",
59 "Platform: Azure",
60 "Use Case: Log Auditing",
61 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
62 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
63]
64timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
65type = "query"
66
67query = '''
68data_stream.dataset: "azure.activitylogs"
69 and event.action: "MICROSOFT.EVENTHUB/NAMESPACES/DELETE"
70 and event.outcome: "success"
71 and not source.as.organization.name: (
72 "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
73 or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
74 )
75'''
76
77
78[[rule.threat]]
79framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
80[[rule.threat.technique]]
81id = "T1562"
82name = "Impair Defenses"
83reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
84[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
85id = "T1562.008"
86name = "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"
87reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/"
88
89
90[rule.threat.tactic]
91id = "TA0005"
92name = "Defense Evasion"
93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
94
95[rule.investigation_fields]
96field_names = [
97 "@timestamp",
98 "azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id",
99 "azure.resource.name",
100 "azure.resource.group",
101 "source.ip",
102 "source.as.organization.name",
103 "event.action",
104 "event.outcome",
105 "cloud.account.id",
106]
Triage and analysis
Investigating Azure Event Hub Namespace Deleted
Event Hub namespaces frequently carry diagnostic/activity/sign-in log egress to monitoring pipelines. Deleting one can blind detection by cutting off that telemetry, and may precede or accompany other malicious activity.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify the deleted namespace (
azure.resource.name) and whether it was a logging/diagnostics egress hub. - Identify the acting principal (
azure.activitylogs.identity.authorization.evidence.principal_id) and whether the deletion was expected. - Review
source.as.organization.nameand source IP; confirm it aligns with normal administration. - Check diagnostic settings that targeted the namespace and whether log egress stopped after the deletion.
False positive analysis
- CI/CD pipelines routinely create and delete ephemeral namespaces; baseline those principals and networks.
Response and remediation
- If unexpected, restore diagnostic settings to a healthy egress target, verify log ingestion resumed, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on
Microsoft.EventHub/namespaces/*.
References
Related rules
- Azure Resource Group Deleted by Unusual Principal
- Azure Event Hub Deleted
- Azure Kubernetes Services (AKS) Kubernetes Events Deleted
- Azure Diagnostic Settings Deleted
- Microsoft Foundry Content Filter Modified or Deleted