Anthropic Organization IP Restriction Deleted
Organization IP restrictions limit Anthropic administrative access to approved network ranges. Deleting one widens where a compromised admin session or API key can be used. The audit event does not always carry the deleted CIDR or restriction identifier, so treat this as an early signal and pivot to nearby IP restriction create or update events for the same organization.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
3integration = ["anthropic"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/21"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Organization IP restrictions limit Anthropic administrative access to approved network ranges. Deleting one widens
11where a compromised admin session or API key can be used. The audit event does not always carry the deleted CIDR or
12restriction identifier, so treat this as an early signal and pivot to nearby IP restriction create or update events
13for the same organization.
14"""
15false_positives = [
16 """
17 Network or security teams remove IP restrictions during office moves, VPN migrations, or policy redesigns.
18 Validate the actor, and confirm replacement restrictions were applied if the control is still required.
19 """,
20]
21from = "now-9m"
22language = "esql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "Anthropic Organization IP Restriction Deleted"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating Anthropic Organization IP Restriction Deleted
28
29IP allowlists limit where admin sessions and admin API keys can be used. Deleting a restriction widens that surface.
30The delete event often lacks the removed CIDR — recover it from nearby create/update events.
31
32Unauthorized = no network/security change ticket for allowlist work, no replacement `org_ip_restriction_created` /
33`org_ip_restriction_updated` in the same window, or deletion paired with admin key creation / SSO weakening.
34
35#### Possible investigation steps
36
37- Identify actor type. For `user_actor`, check admin identity via `user.email`, `source.ip`, and UA. For
38 `anthropic_actor`, pivot on `organization.id` only.
39- Search the same org for `org_ip_restriction_created` / `org_ip_restriction_updated` before/after the delete to
40 recover ranges and see if this was a replace vs a standalone removal.
41- Correlate ±hours for admin role grants, admin API key creation, SSO changes, or data exports — common follow-ons
42 after network controls drop.
43- Close as FP when a ticket names the migration and a replacement restriction appears promptly. Escalate when deletion
44 stands alone or admin activity from non-corporate IPs follows.
45
46### False positive analysis
47
48- Office moves and VPN redesigns often remove old ranges before new ones are applied.
49
50### Response and remediation
51
52- On unauthorized deletion: restore required IP restrictions, review admin activity from non-corporate `source.ip`
53 during the open window, and rotate admin credentials / API keys used in that period.
54"""
55references = [
56 "https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list",
57]
58risk_score = 73
59rule_id = "ae472523-3854-4b2b-868d-a001c764a136"
60severity = "high"
61tags = [
62 "Domain: GenAI",
63 "Platform: Anthropic",
64 "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
65 "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
66 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
67 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
68 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
69 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
70]
71timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
72type = "esql"
73
74query = '''
75from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
76| where
77 data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
78 mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
79 event.action == "org_ip_restriction_deleted"
80| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
81'''
82
83
84[[rule.threat]]
85framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
86[[rule.threat.technique]]
87id = "T1562"
88name = "Impair Defenses"
89reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
90[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
91id = "T1562.007"
92name = "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"
93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007/"
94
95
96
97[rule.threat.tactic]
98id = "TA0005"
99name = "Defense Evasion"
100reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
101
102[rule.investigation_fields]
103field_names = [
104 "@timestamp",
105 "event.action",
106 "event.id",
107 "organization.id",
108 "anthropic.audit.actor.type",
109 "user.email",
110 "user.id",
111 "source.ip",
112 "user_agent.original",
113]
Triage and analysis
Investigating Anthropic Organization IP Restriction Deleted
IP allowlists limit where admin sessions and admin API keys can be used. Deleting a restriction widens that surface. The delete event often lacks the removed CIDR — recover it from nearby create/update events.
Unauthorized = no network/security change ticket for allowlist work, no replacement org_ip_restriction_created /
org_ip_restriction_updated in the same window, or deletion paired with admin key creation / SSO weakening.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify actor type. For
user_actor, check admin identity viauser.email,source.ip, and UA. Foranthropic_actor, pivot onorganization.idonly. - Search the same org for
org_ip_restriction_created/org_ip_restriction_updatedbefore/after the delete to recover ranges and see if this was a replace vs a standalone removal. - Correlate ±hours for admin role grants, admin API key creation, SSO changes, or data exports — common follow-ons after network controls drop.
- Close as FP when a ticket names the migration and a replacement restriction appears promptly. Escalate when deletion stands alone or admin activity from non-corporate IPs follows.
False positive analysis
- Office moves and VPN redesigns often remove old ranges before new ones are applied.
Response and remediation
- On unauthorized deletion: restore required IP restrictions, review admin activity from non-corporate
source.ipduring the open window, and rotate admin credentials / API keys used in that period.
References
Related rules
- Anthropic Magic Link Second Factor Disabled
- Anthropic SSO Disabled or Connection Removed
- Anthropic Admin API Key Created
- Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted
- Anthropic Admin Role Assigned to User