-
Identifies the creation, modification, or deletion of a content filter (RAI policy) or a custom blocklist on a Microsoft Foundry (Azure AI Services) account. Content filters decide which prompt and completion categories, jailbreak attempts, and protected material a model deployment blocks. An adversary with control of the account can weaken or remove these filters so that harmful prompts and outputs are no longer blocked or logged as filtered, which removes a guardrail and the detections that depend on its verdicts.
Read More -
Microsoft Foundry Keys or Connection Secrets Accessed by New Principal
Oct 27, 2026 · Domain: Cloud Domain: GenAI Data Source: Azure Data Source: Azure Activity Logs Data Source: Microsoft Foundry Platform: Azure Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Credential Access Tactic: Initial Access Threat: LLMjacking Threat: Unauthorized AI Usage Mitre Atlas: AML.T0055 Resources: Investigation Guide Rule Type: New Terms ·Identifies the first time in seven days that a high-privilege Azure principal lists or regenerates the API keys of a Microsoft Foundry (Azure AI Services) account, or reads the stored secrets of a Foundry account or project connection. Account keys grant direct inference access to every model deployment on the account and bypass Entra ID conditional access, and connection secrets hold credentials for downstream services such as Azure OpenAI, storage, and search. A compromised identity retrieving these keys is a common first step in LLMjacking and in pivoting from a Foundry project to the data it is connected to.
Read More -
Detects one caller IP sending a high number of requests and consuming a high number of tokens against the same Foundry deployment and operation during the rule lookback. That rate fits a script or a stolen key burning quota. The rule uses RequestResponse logs and does not need the prompt text. Tune the request count and token sum in the query.
Read More -
Detects a Microsoft Foundry chat, sent through API Management, where Azure sets jailbreak.detected on the prompt. The flag is on the prompt filter when the call is allowed through, and on the error body when the filter blocks the call.
Read More -
Detects a Microsoft Foundry chat, sent through API Management, whose prompt or assistant reply contains a known credential pattern or an email address together with a password assignment. The model often refuses the request and Azure content filters stay clear, so the secret is only visible in the logged message text.
Read More -
Detects three or more completed assistant refusals from the same client, API Management subscription, and model. Matching replies finished on their own (finish_reason stop) and declined the prompt. A burst means that caller kept sending prompts the model will not answer.
Read More -
Microsoft Foundry Subscription Key Impossible Travel
Oct 5, 2026 · Data Source: Microsoft Foundry Use Case: Threat Detection Mitre Atlas: AML.T0091 Mitre Atlas: AML.T0012 Resources: Investigation Guide Tactic: Credential Access Tactic: Initial Access Rule Type: ES|QL Platform: Azure Domain: Cloud Domain: GenAI Service: Azure API Management Threat: Impossible Travel ·Detects the same API Management subscription key calling Microsoft Foundry from source IPs in two or more countries, far enough apart and fast enough that the hop is not physical travel. Calls are grouped by apim_subscription_id. Requests with no subscription key are ignored, because those are unauthenticated calls and share no key.
Read More