Open redirect: Ticketmaster

 1name: "Open redirect: Ticketmaster"
 2description: |
 3    Message contains use of the Ticketmaster open redirect, but the sender is not Ticketmaster. This has been exploited in the wild.
 4references:
 5  - "https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/127q4ny/ticketmaster_systems_exploited_for_phishing/"
 6type: "rule"
 7severity: "low"
 8source: |
 9  type.inbound
10  and any(body.links,
11          .href_url.domain.domain == 'links.engage.ticketmaster.com' and .href_url.path =~ '/ctt'
12  )
13  and sender.email.domain.root_domain != 'ticketmaster.com'
14  and headers.return_path.domain.root_domain != "ticketmaster.com"
15
16  and (
17    not profile.by_sender().solicited
18    or (
19      profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
20      and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
21    )
22  )
23
24  // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
25  and (
26    (
27      sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
28      and (
29        any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),
30            strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail")
31        )
32      )
33    )
34    or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
35  )  
36tags:
37  - "Attack surface reduction"
38attack_types:
39  - "Credential Phishing"
40  - "Malware/Ransomware"
41tactics_and_techniques:
42  - "Open redirect"
43detection_methods:
44  - "Sender analysis"
45  - "URL analysis"
46id: "a5b3901f-e57b-5fb9-a3d7-ee2205cc0c5b"