Open Redirect: adnxs.com
Message contains use of the adnxs.com redirect with getuid parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
Sublime rule (View on GitHub)
1name: "Open Redirect: adnxs.com"
2description: |
3 Message contains use of the adnxs.com redirect with getuid parameter. This has been exploited in phishing campaigns to redirect users to malicious sites.
4type: "rule"
5severity: "medium"
6source: |
7 type.inbound
8 and any(body.links,
9 (
10 .href_url.domain.domain == "ib.adnxs.com"
11 and strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '/getuid')
12 // Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
13 and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
14 'getuid\?(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
15 )
16 )
17 // second form of an open redirect
18 or (
19 .href_url.domain.domain == "secure.adnxs.com"
20 and strings.icontains(.href_url.query_params, 'redir=')
21 // Make sure the redirect is not going back to adnxs.com
22 and not regex.icontains(.href_url.query_params,
23 'redir=(?:https?(?:%3a|:))?(?:%2f|\/){2}[^&]*adnxs\.com(?:\&|\/|$|%2f)'
24 )
25 )
26 )
27 and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "adnxs.com"
28 and not sender.email.domain.root_domain == "appnexus.com"
29
30 // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
31 and (
32 (
33 sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
34 and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
35 )
36 or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
37 )
38attack_types:
39 - "Credential Phishing"
40 - "Malware/Ransomware"
41tactics_and_techniques:
42 - "Open redirect"
43detection_methods:
44 - "Sender analysis"
45 - "URL analysis"
46id: "7fc92916-6c7a-53dd-9487-22b11ee062b3"