Credential phishing: Email delivery failure impersonation
Detects phishing emails impersonating email system notifications claiming delivery failures, rejected messages, or email system issues requiring user action to 'fix' or 'recover' email functionality. These attacks typically claim incoming emails couldn't be delivered and direct users to malicious portals to harvest credentials.
Sublime rule (View on GitHub)
1name: "Credential phishing: Email delivery failure impersonation"
2description: |
3 Detects phishing emails impersonating email system notifications claiming delivery failures,
4 rejected messages, or email system issues requiring user action to 'fix' or 'recover' email functionality.
5 These attacks typically claim incoming emails couldn't be delivered and direct users to malicious
6 portals to harvest credentials.
7type: "rule"
8severity: "high"
9source: |
10 type.inbound
11 and (
12 any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
13 .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
14 )
15 or (
16 length(body.current_thread.text) < 250
17 and any(recipients.to,
18 strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.domain.sld)
19 or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, .email.local_part)
20 )
21 )
22 )
23 and (
24 regex.icontains(subject.subject, '(e)?mail(s)?')
25 or (
26 length(body.current_thread.text) < 700
27 and strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, '*mail*')
28 )
29 or (length(subject.base) == 0 or subject.base is null)
30 )
31 and 3 of (
32 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*incoming messages*"),
33 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*server error*"),
34 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*blocked*"),
35 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*prevented*"),
36 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*notification*"),
37 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*fix email issues*"),
38 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejected*"),
39 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*recover and prevent*"),
40 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failure*"),
41 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*rejection*"),
42 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*failed*"),
43 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*deleted in 24 hours*"),
44 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*immediate attention*"),
45 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*restore these messages*"),
46 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*take action if needed*"),
47 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*##year##*"),
48 strings.ilike(body.current_thread.text, "*mail delivery subsystem*"),
49 regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
50 '#\d+(?:\.\d+)*\s+The email account does not exist'
51 )
52 )
53 and (
54 any(body.links,
55 regex.icontains(.display_text,
56 "view",
57 "messages",
58 "recover",
59 "fix",
60 "portal",
61 "connect",
62 "confirm"
63 )
64 and not .display_text == "View Report"
65 )
66 or (
67 length(body.links) < 3
68 and any(body.links,
69 .mismatched
70 and any(recipients.to,
71 .email.domain.root_domain == ..display_url.domain.root_domain
72 )
73 )
74 )
75 or (all(recipients.to, .email.local_part == sender.display_name))
76 or any(body.links,
77 any(.href_url.rewrite.encoders, . == "proofpoint")
78 and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $tranco_50k
79 and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
80 )
81 or any(recipients.to,
82 strings.icontains(sender.display_name,
83 strings.concat('MyReport For ', .email.local_part)
84 )
85 )
86 )
87 and not any(body.links,
88 regex.icontains(.display_text,
89 "view document",
90 "review (&|and) sign document"
91 )
92 )
93 and sender.email.domain.root_domain not in (
94 "bing.com",
95 "microsoft.com",
96 "microsoftonline.com",
97 "microsoftsupport.com",
98 "microsoft365.com",
99 "office.com",
100 "office365.com",
101 "onedrive.com",
102 "sharepointonline.com",
103 "yammer.com",
104 "ppops.net",
105 "opentext.com",
106 "getsentry.com"
107 )
108
109 // negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
110 and (
111 (
112 sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
113 and (
114 not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
115 // MS emails from an org domain are router "internally" to MS, therefore, there is no authentication information
116 or not (
117 headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
118 and all(headers.domains,
119 .root_domain in ("outlook.com", "office365.com")
120 )
121 // typical emails from freemail Outlook accounts are from prod.outlook.com
122 and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, "protection.outlook.com>")
123 )
124 )
125 )
126 or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains
127 )
128
129 // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
130 and not (
131 sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
132 and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
133 )
134 and not profile.by_sender().solicited
135 and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
136
137attack_types:
138 - "Credential Phishing"
139tactics_and_techniques:
140 - "Impersonation: Brand"
141 - "Social engineering"
142detection_methods:
143 - "Content analysis"
144 - "Natural Language Understanding"
145 - "Sender analysis"
146id: "ee318b89-0d4e-5c94-80ad-08991d3958b2"