Cmd Launched with Hidden Start Flags to Suspicious Targets
Detects cmd.exe executing commands with the "start" utility using "/b" (no window) or "/min" (minimized) flags. To reduce false positives from standard background tasks, detection is restricted to scenarios where the target is a known script extension or located in suspicious temporary/public directories. This technique was observed in Chaos, DarkSide, and Emotet malware campaigns.
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Cmd Launched with Hidden Start Flags to Suspicious Targets
2id: 5a6b7c8d-9e0f-1a2b-3c4d-5e6f7a8b9c0d
3status: experimental
4description: |
5 Detects cmd.exe executing commands with the "start" utility using "/b" (no window) or "/min" (minimized) flags.
6 To reduce false positives from standard background tasks, detection is restricted to scenarios where the target is a known script extension or located in suspicious temporary/public directories.
7 This technique was observed in Chaos, DarkSide, and Emotet malware campaigns.
8references:
9 - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/evolution-of-chaos-ransomware-faster-smarter-and-more-dangerous
10 - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/newly-discovered-function-in-darkside-ransomware-variant-targets-disk-partitions
11 - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ms-office-files-involved-in-emotet-trojan-campaign-pt-one
12 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/start
13tags:
14 - attack.defense-evasion
15 - attack.t1564.003
16author: Vladan Sekulic, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
17date: 2026-01-24
18logsource:
19 category: process_creation
20 product: windows
21detection:
22 selection_cmd_img:
23 - Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
24 - OriginalFileName: 'Cmd.Exe'
25 selection_cmd_hidden_start_1:
26 CommandLine|contains|windash:
27 - 'start '
28 - 'start/b'
29 - 'start/min'
30 selection_cmd_hidden_start_2:
31 CommandLine|contains|windash:
32 - '/b '
33 - '/b"'
34 - '/min '
35 - '/min"'
36 selection_cli_uncommon_location:
37 CommandLine|contains:
38 - ':\Perflogs\'
39 - ':\Temp\'
40 - ':\Users\Default\'
41 - ':\Windows\Temp\'
42 - '\AppData\Roaming\'
43 - '\Contacts\'
44 - '\Documents\'
45 - '\Downloads\'
46 - '\Favorites\'
47 - '\Favourites\'
48 - '\inetpub\'
49 - '\Music\'
50 - '\Photos\'
51 - '\Temporary Internet\'
52 - '\Users\Public\'
53 - '\Videos\'
54 selection_cli_susp_extension:
55 CommandLine|contains:
56 - '.bat'
57 - '.cmd'
58 - '.cpl'
59 - '.hta'
60 - '.js'
61 - '.ps1'
62 - '.scr'
63 - '.vbe'
64 - '.vbs'
65 selection_cli_susp_pattern:
66 CommandLine|contains:
67 - ' -nop '
68 - ' -sta '
69 - '.downloadfile(' # PowerShell download command
70 - '.downloadstring(' # PowerShell download command
71 - '-noni '
72 - '-w hidden '
73 condition: all of selection_cmd_* and 1 of selection_cli_*
74falsepositives:
75 - Legitimate administrative scripts running from temporary folders.
76 - Niche software updaters utilizing hidden batch files in ProgramData.
77level: medium # Can be increased after an initial baseline and tuning
78regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_launched_with_hidden_start_flag/info.yml
References
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