Tor Client/Browser Execution
Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Tor Client/Browser Execution
2id: 62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c
3status: test
4description: Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
5references:
6 - https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
7author: frack113
8date: 2022-02-20
9modified: 2025-10-27
10tags:
11 - attack.command-and-control
12 - attack.t1090.003
13logsource:
14 category: process_creation
15 product: windows
16detection:
17 selection:
18 - Description: 'Tor Browser'
19 - Product: 'Tor Browser'
20 - Image|endswith:
21 - '\tor.exe'
22 - '\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe'
23 condition: selection
24falsepositives:
25 - Unknown
26level: high
27regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_tor_execution/info.yml
References
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