Potential WSL Binary Modification from Installed Location
Detects the modification of the wsl.exe binary from its installed location. Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Potential WSL Binary Modification from Installed Location
2id: 2f400434-01e1-416b-b52c-bb5bfbb9eb78
3status: experimental
4description: |
5 Detects the modification of the wsl.exe binary from its installed location.
6 Attackers can replace the legitimate wsl.exe binary with a malicious payload in its place, which is then executed when the user runs WSL, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
7references:
8 - https://cardinalops.com/blog/bash-and-switch-hijacking-via-windows-subsystem-for-linux/
9 - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/04/20/implications-of-windows-subsystem-for-linux-for-adversaries-defenders-part-2
10 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-malware-uses-windows-subsystem-for-linux-for-stealthy-attacks/
11 - https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/new-malware-targets-windows-subsystem.html
12 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/
13author: Liran Ravich, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
14date: 2026-05-05
15tags:
16 - attack.stealth
17 - attack.t1036.005
18 - attack.t1218
19logsource:
20 category: file_event
21 product: windows
22detection:
23 selection_wsl_exe:
24 TargetFilename|endswith: '\wsl.exe'
25 selection_wsl_folder:
26 - TargetFilename|contains:
27 - ':\Program files\wsl\'
28 - ':\Program files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux_'
29 - TargetFilename|contains|all:
30 - ':\Users\'
31 - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\'
32 filter_main_msiexec:
33 Image:
34 - 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
35 - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe'
36 filter_main_svchost:
37 Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
38 TargetFilename|contains: '\WindowsApps\'
39 condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
40falsepositives:
41 - Unlikely
42level: medium
43regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wsl_binary_modification/info.yml
References
Related rules
- Suspicious WSL Binary Hijack via Proxy Execution
- Suspicious WSL Binary Masquerading
- Potential Binary Impersonating Sysinternals Tools
- Potential WSL InstallLocation Registry Key Modification
- Suspicious WSL InstallLocation Registry Key Modification Via CommandLine