Detection of Possible Rotten Potato
Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE privileges
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Detection of Possible Rotten Potato
2id: 6c5808ee-85a2-4e56-8137-72e5876a5096
3description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE privileges
4references:
5 - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
6 - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
7tags:
8 - attack.privilege_escalation
9 - attack.t1134 # an old one
10 - attack.t1134.002
11status: unsupported
12author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
13date: 2019/10/26
14modified: 2020/09/01
15logsource:
16 category: process_creation
17 product: windows
18 definition: Works only if Enrich Sysmon events with additional information about process in ParentUser check enrichment section
19detection:
20 selection:
21 ParentUser:
22 - 'NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE'
23 - 'NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE'
24 User: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'
25 rundllexception:
26 Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
27 CommandLine|contains: 'DavSetCookie'
28 condition: selection and not rundllexception
29falsepositives:
30 - Unknown
31level: high
32enrichment:
33 - EN_0001_cache_sysmon_event_id_1_info # http://bit.ly/314zc6x
34 - EN_0002_enrich_sysmon_event_id_1_with_parent_info # http://bit.ly/2KmSC0l
References
Related rules
- Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
- CVE-2021-3156 Exploitation Attempt
- CVE-2021-3156 Exploitation Attempt Bruteforcing
- Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Source Using Kerberos
- Failed Logins with Different Accounts from Single Source System