Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation
Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2021/10/13"
3integration = ["windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/10/15"
6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by
13masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation"
20references = [
21 "https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/",
22 "https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato",
23 "https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354",
24]
25risk_score = 73
26rule_id = "76ddb638-abf7-42d5-be22-4a70b0bf7241"
27setup = """## Setup
28
29Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings:
30`condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"`
31
32If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
33events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
34Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
35`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
36For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
37"""
38severity = "high"
39tags = [
40 "Domain: Endpoint",
41 "OS: Windows",
42 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
43 "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
44 "Data Source: Sysmon",
45]
46timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
47type = "eql"
48
49query = '''
50file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action : "Pipe Created*" and
51 /* normal sysmon named pipe creation events truncate the pipe keyword */
52 file.name : "\\*\\Pipe\\*"
53'''
54
55
56[[rule.threat]]
57framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
58[[rule.threat.technique]]
59id = "T1134"
60name = "Access Token Manipulation"
61reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"
62
63
64[rule.threat.tactic]
65id = "TA0004"
66name = "Privilege Escalation"
67reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
References
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