User Account Creation

Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence on a system or domain.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2020/02/18"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2025/03/20"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Identifies attempts to create new users. This is sometimes done by attackers to increase access or establish persistence
 11on a system or domain.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = [
 15    "endgame-*",
 16    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
 17    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 18    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
 19    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
 20    "logs-system.security*",
 21    "logs-windows.forwarded*",
 22    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
 23    "winlogbeat-*",
 24]
 25language = "eql"
 26license = "Elastic License v2"
 27name = "User Account Creation"
 28note = """## Triage and analysis
 29
 30### Investigating User Account Creation
 31
 32Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.
 33
 34This rule identifies the usage of `net.exe` to create new accounts.
 35
 36#### Possible investigation steps
 37
 38- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
 39- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
 40- Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
 41- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
 42
 43### False positive analysis
 44
 45- Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
 46
 47### Related rules
 48
 49- Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
 50- Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
 51
 52### Response and remediation
 53
 54- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
 55- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
 56- Delete the created account.
 57- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
 58- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
 59- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
 60"""
 61risk_score = 21
 62rule_id = "1aa9181a-492b-4c01-8b16-fa0735786b2b"
 63severity = "low"
 64tags = [
 65    "Domain: Endpoint",
 66    "OS: Windows",
 67    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 68    "Tactic: Persistence",
 69    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 70    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
 71    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 72    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
 73    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
 74    "Data Source: Sysmon",
 75    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 76    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
 77]
 78timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 79type = "eql"
 80
 81query = '''
 82process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
 83  (process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and not process.parent.name : "net.exe") and
 84  (process.args : "user" and process.args : ("/ad", "/add"))
 85'''
 86
 87
 88[[rule.threat]]
 89framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 90[[rule.threat.technique]]
 91id = "T1136"
 92name = "Create Account"
 93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
 94[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 95id = "T1136.001"
 96name = "Local Account"
 97reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
 98
 99
100
101[rule.threat.tactic]
102id = "TA0003"
103name = "Persistence"
104reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
...
toml

Attackers may create new accounts (both local and domain) to maintain access to victim systems.

This rule identifies the usage of net.exe to create new accounts.

  • Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
  • Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
  • Identify if the account was added to privileged groups or assigned special privileges after creation.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  • Account creation is a common administrative task, so there is a high chance of the activity being legitimate. Before investigating further, verify that this activity is not benign.
  • Creation of a Hidden Local User Account - 2edc8076-291e-41e9-81e4-e3fcbc97ae5e
  • Windows User Account Creation - 38e17753-f581-4644-84da-0d60a8318694
  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
  • Delete the created account.
  • Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
  • Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
  • Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

Related rules

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