Account Password Reset Remotely

calendar May 22, 2024 · Domain: Endpoint OS: Windows Use Case: Threat Detection Tactic: Persistence Tactic: Impact  ·
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Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2021/10/18"
 3integration = ["system", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2024/05/21"
 6
 7[rule]
 8author = ["Elastic"]
 9description = """
10Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account
11passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
12"""
13false_positives = ["Legitimate remote account administration."]
14from = "now-9m"
15index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*"]
16language = "eql"
17license = "Elastic License v2"
18name = "Account Password Reset Remotely"
19note = """
20## Performance
21This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity.
22"""
23references = [
24    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724",
25    "https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/",
26    "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx",
27    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
28]
29risk_score = 47
30rule_id = "2820c9c2-bcd7-4d6e-9eba-faf3891ba450"
31severity = "medium"
32tags = [
33    "Domain: Endpoint",
34    "OS: Windows",
35    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
36    "Tactic: Persistence",
37    "Tactic: Impact",
38]
39type = "eql"
40
41query = '''
42sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
43  [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
44    /* event 4624 need to be logged */
45    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and
46    source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
47    not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("svc*", "PIM_*", "_*_", "*-*-*", "*$")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
48   /* event 4724 need to be logged */
49  [iam where event.action == "reset-password" and
50   (
51    /*
52       This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged accounts, duplicate the
53       rule and add your own naming convention and accounts of interest here.
54     */
55    winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*", "*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
56    winlog.event_data.TargetSid : ("S-1-5-21-*-500", "S-1-12-1-*-500")
57    )
58  ] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
59'''
60
61
62[[rule.threat]]
63framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
64[[rule.threat.technique]]
65id = "T1098"
66name = "Account Manipulation"
67reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
68
69
70[rule.threat.tactic]
71id = "TA0003"
72name = "Persistence"
73reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
74[[rule.threat]]
75framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
76[[rule.threat.technique]]
77id = "T1531"
78name = "Account Access Removal"
79reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
80
81
82[rule.threat.tactic]
83id = "TA0040"
84name = "Impact"
85reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"

Performance

This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity.

References

Related rules

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