Account Password Reset Remotely

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2021/10/18"
 3integration = ["system", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2024/10/15"
 6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
 7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account
13passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
14"""
15false_positives = ["Legitimate remote account administration."]
16from = "now-9m"
17index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*"]
18language = "eql"
19license = "Elastic License v2"
20name = "Account Password Reset Remotely"
21note = """
22## Performance
23This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity.
24"""
25references = [
26    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724",
27    "https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/",
28    "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx",
29    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
30]
31risk_score = 47
32rule_id = "2820c9c2-bcd7-4d6e-9eba-faf3891ba450"
33severity = "medium"
34tags = [
35    "Domain: Endpoint",
36    "OS: Windows",
37    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
38    "Tactic: Persistence",
39    "Tactic: Impact",
40    "Data Source: System",
41]
42type = "eql"
43
44query = '''
45sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
46  [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
47    /* event 4624 need to be logged */
48    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and
49    source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
50    not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("svc*", "PIM_*", "_*_", "*-*-*", "*$")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
51   /* event 4724 need to be logged */
52  [iam where event.action == "reset-password" and
53   (
54    /*
55       This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged accounts, duplicate the
56       rule and add your own naming convention and accounts of interest here.
57     */
58    winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*", "*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
59    winlog.event_data.TargetSid : ("S-1-5-21-*-500", "S-1-12-1-*-500")
60    )
61  ] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
62'''
63
64
65[[rule.threat]]
66framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
67[[rule.threat.technique]]
68id = "T1098"
69name = "Account Manipulation"
70reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
71
72
73[rule.threat.tactic]
74id = "TA0003"
75name = "Persistence"
76reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
77[[rule.threat]]
78framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
79[[rule.threat.technique]]
80id = "T1531"
81name = "Account Access Removal"
82reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
83
84
85[rule.threat.tactic]
86id = "TA0040"
87name = "Impact"
88reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"