Account Password Reset Remotely

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2021/10/18"
 3integration = ["system", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2024/08/07"
 6
 7[rule]
 8author = ["Elastic"]
 9description = """
10Identifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account
11passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
12"""
13false_positives = ["Legitimate remote account administration."]
14from = "now-9m"
15index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*"]
16language = "eql"
17license = "Elastic License v2"
18name = "Account Password Reset Remotely"
19note = """
20## Performance
21This rule may cause medium to high performance impact due to logic scoping all remote Windows logon activity.
22"""
23references = [
24    "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724",
25    "https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/",
26    "https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx",
27    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/detect-credential-access",
28]
29risk_score = 47
30rule_id = "2820c9c2-bcd7-4d6e-9eba-faf3891ba450"
31severity = "medium"
32tags = [
33    "Domain: Endpoint",
34    "OS: Windows",
35    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
36    "Tactic: Persistence",
37    "Tactic: Impact",
38    "Data Source: System",
39]
40type = "eql"
41
42query = '''
43sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=1m
44  [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and
45    /* event 4624 need to be logged */
46    winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and
47    source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" and
48    not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("svc*", "PIM_*", "_*_", "*-*-*", "*$")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId
49   /* event 4724 need to be logged */
50  [iam where event.action == "reset-password" and
51   (
52    /*
53       This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged accounts, duplicate the
54       rule and add your own naming convention and accounts of interest here.
55     */
56    winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*", "*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
57    winlog.event_data.TargetSid : ("S-1-5-21-*-500", "S-1-12-1-*-500")
58    )
59  ] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
60'''
61
62
63[[rule.threat]]
64framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
65[[rule.threat.technique]]
66id = "T1098"
67name = "Account Manipulation"
68reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
69
70
71[rule.threat.tactic]
72id = "TA0003"
73name = "Persistence"
74reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
75[[rule.threat]]
76framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
77[[rule.threat.technique]]
78id = "T1531"
79name = "Account Access Removal"
80reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
81
82
83[rule.threat.tactic]
84id = "TA0040"
85name = "Impact"
86reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"