Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares
Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or preparation for data exfiltration.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/11/02"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/05/21"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Identifies the use of net.exe to mount a WebDav or hidden remote share. This may indicate lateral movement or
11preparation for data exfiltration.
12"""
13from = "now-9m"
14index = [
15 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
16 "winlogbeat-*",
17 "logs-windows.*",
18 "endgame-*",
19 "logs-system.security*",
20]
21language = "eql"
22license = "Elastic License v2"
23name = "Mounting Hidden or WebDav Remote Shares"
24risk_score = 47
25rule_id = "c4210e1c-64f2-4f48-b67e-b5a8ffe3aa14"
26setup = """## Setup
27
28If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
29events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
30Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
31`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
32For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
33"""
34severity = "medium"
35tags = [
36 "Domain: Endpoint",
37 "OS: Windows",
38 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
39 "Tactic: Initial Access",
40 "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
41 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
42 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
43]
44timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
45type = "eql"
46
47query = '''
48process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
49 ((process.name : "net.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net.exe") or ((process.name : "net1.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "net1.exe") and
50 not process.parent.name : "net.exe")) and
51 process.args : "use" and
52 /* including hidden and webdav based online shares such as onedrive */
53 process.args : ("\\\\*\\*$*", "\\\\*@SSL\\*", "http*") and
54 /* excluding shares deletion operation */
55 not process.args : "/d*"
56'''
57
58
59[[rule.threat]]
60framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
61[[rule.threat.technique]]
62id = "T1021"
63name = "Remote Services"
64reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
65[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
66id = "T1021.002"
67name = "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"
68reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/"
69
70
71
72[rule.threat.tactic]
73id = "TA0008"
74name = "Lateral Movement"
75reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
76[[rule.threat]]
77framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
78[[rule.threat.technique]]
79id = "T1078"
80name = "Valid Accounts"
81reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
82[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
83id = "T1078.003"
84name = "Local Accounts"
85reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/"
86
87
88
89[rule.threat.tactic]
90id = "TA0001"
91name = "Initial Access"
92reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
93[[rule.threat]]
94framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
95[[rule.threat.technique]]
96id = "T1087"
97name = "Account Discovery"
98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/"
99[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
100id = "T1087.001"
101name = "Local Account"
102reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/"
103
104[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
105id = "T1087.002"
106name = "Domain Account"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/"
108
109
110
111[rule.threat.tactic]
112id = "TA0007"
113name = "Discovery"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
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