Suspicious Explorer Child Process
Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/10/29"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
4maturity = "production"
5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
7updated_date = "2024/03/28"
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or
13executables from a trusted parent process.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Suspicious Explorer Child Process"
20risk_score = 47
21rule_id = "9a5b4e31-6cde-4295-9ff7-6be1b8567e1b"
22setup = """## Setup
23
24If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
25events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
26Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
27`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
28For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
29"""
30severity = "medium"
31tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Initial Access", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
32timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
33type = "eql"
34
35query = '''
36process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
37 (
38 process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe") or
39 process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "Cmd.Exe", "MSHTA.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE")
40 ) and
41 /* Explorer started via DCOM */
42 process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" and
43 not process.parent.args:
44 (
45 /* Noisy CLSID_SeparateSingleProcessExplorerHost Explorer COM Class IDs */
46 "/factory,{5BD95610-9434-43C2-886C-57852CC8A120}",
47 "/factory,{ceff45ee-c862-41de-aee2-a022c81eda92}"
48 )
49'''
50
51
52[[rule.threat]]
53framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
54[[rule.threat.technique]]
55id = "T1566"
56name = "Phishing"
57reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
58[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
59id = "T1566.001"
60name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
61reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
62
63[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
64id = "T1566.002"
65name = "Spearphishing Link"
66reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"
67
68
69
70[rule.threat.tactic]
71id = "TA0001"
72name = "Initial Access"
73reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
74
75[[rule.threat]]
76framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
77[[rule.threat.technique]]
78id = "T1059"
79name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
80reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
81[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
82id = "T1059.001"
83name = "PowerShell"
84reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
85
86[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
87id = "T1059.003"
88name = "Windows Command Shell"
89reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
90[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
91id = "T1059.005"
92name = "Visual Basic"
93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/"
94
95
96
97[rule.threat.tactic]
98id = "TA0002"
99name = "Execution"
100reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
101
102[[rule.threat]]
103framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
104[[rule.threat.technique]]
105id = "T1218"
106name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
107reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
108
109
110
111[rule.threat.tactic]
112id = "TA0005"
113name = "Defense Evasion"
114reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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