Potential ADIDNS Poisoning via Wildcard Record Creation

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2024/03/26"
 3integration = ["system", "windows"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
 6min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
 7updated_date = "2024/03/26"
 8
 9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Active Directory Integrated DNS (ADIDNS) is one of the core components of AD DS, leveraging AD's access control and
13replication to maintain domain consistency. It stores DNS zones as AD objects, a feature that, while robust, introduces
14some security issues, such as wildcard records, mainly because of the default permission (Any authenticated users) to
15create DNS-named records. Attackers can create wildcard records to redirect traffic that doesn't explicitly match
16records contained in the zone, becoming the Man-in-the-Middle and being able to abuse DNS similarly to LLMNR/NBNS spoofing.
17"""
18from = "now-9m"
19index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-system.*", "logs-windows.*"]
20language = "eql"
21license = "Elastic License v2"
22name = "Potential ADIDNS Poisoning via Wildcard Record Creation"
23references = [
24    "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/exploiting-adidns/",
25    "https://www.thehacker.recipes/a-d/movement/mitm-and-coerced-authentications/adidns-spoofing"
26]
27risk_score = 73
28rule_id = "8f242ffb-b191-4803-90ec-0f19942e17fd"
29setup = """## Setup
30
31The 'Audit Directory Service Changes' logging policy must be configured for (Success, Failure).
32Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:

1
2The above policy does not cover the target object by default (we still need it to be configured to generate events), so we need to set up an AuditRule using https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule.

 1"""
 2severity = "high"
 3tags = [
 4    "Domain: Endpoint",
 5    "OS: Windows",
 6    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 7    "Tactic: Credential Access",
 8    "Data Source: Active Directory",
 9    "Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring"
10]
11timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
12type = "eql"
13
14query = '''
15any where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "Directory Service Changes" and
16    event.code == "5137" and startsWith(winlog.event_data.ObjectDN, "DC=*,")
17'''
18
19
20[[rule.threat]]
21framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
22[[rule.threat.technique]]
23id = "T1557"
24name = "Adversary-in-the-Middle"
25reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/"
26
27
28
29[rule.threat.tactic]
30id = "TA0006"
31name = "Credential Access"
32reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"