Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2026/03/18"
  3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender", "system", "crowdstrike"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2026/03/18"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10Detects shell executions (cmd, PowerShell, rundll32) spawned by Velociraptor. Threat actors have been observed
 11installing Velociraptor to execute shell commands on compromised systems, blending in with legitimate system processes.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = [
 15    "endgame-*",
 16    "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
 17    "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
 18    "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
 19    "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
 20    "logs-system.security*",
 21    "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
 22    "winlogbeat-*",
 23]
 24language = "eql"
 25license = "Elastic License v2"
 26name = "Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor"
 27note = """## Triage and analysis
 28
 29### Investigating Suspicious Shell Execution via Velociraptor
 30
 31Velociraptor is a legitimate endpoint visibility and response tool. Threat actors have been observed deploying it on compromised systems to run shell commands (cmd, PowerShell, rundll32), making their activity look like normal Velociraptor-collector behavior.
 32
 33### Possible investigation steps
 34
 35- Confirm the parent process name matches a Velociraptor binary (e.g. velociraptor.exe, Velociraptor.exe) and the child is cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe.
 36- Review the child process command line for suspicious or interactive commands (e.g. download, lateral movement, credential access) versus known Velociraptor artifact scripts (Get-LocalGroupMember, Get-Date, registry queries, Velociraptor Tools module).
 37- Identify how Velociraptor was installed (dropped by another process, scheduled task, service); correlate with earlier process or file events on the host.
 38- Check whether the Velociraptor executable path and code signature are expected (e.g. Program Files vs. temp or user writable); unauthorized installs are often from non-standard paths.
 39- Correlate with other alerts for the same host or user (initial access, persistence, C2) to determine if this is abuse vs. legitimate IR/DFIR use.
 40
 41### False positive analysis
 42
 43- Legitimate Velociraptor artifacts that run Get-LocalGroupMember, Get-Date, registry Run key checks, or Velociraptor Tools PowerShell module are excluded by the rule; remaining FPs may be custom artifacts. Allowlist by command-line pattern or host if you use Velociraptor for authorized IR and see known-good artifacts.
 44
 45### Response and remediation
 46
 47- If abuse is confirmed: isolate the host, terminate the Velociraptor and child shell processes, and remove the Velociraptor installation (binary, service, config).
 48- Determine how Velociraptor was deployed and close the initial access vector; rotate credentials for affected accounts.
 49- If the deployment was authorized (IR/DFIR), document and tune the rule or add an exception to reduce noise.
 50"""
 51references = [
 52    "https://www.huntress.com/blog/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk-cve-2025-26399",
 53    "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/",
 54]
 55risk_score = 47
 56rule_id = "9aeca498-1e3d-4496-9e12-6ef40047eb23"
 57severity = "medium"
 58tags = [
 59    "Domain: Endpoint",
 60    "OS: Windows",
 61    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 62    "Tactic: Command and Control",
 63    "Tactic: Execution",
 64    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
 65    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
 66    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 67    "Data Source: Sysmon",
 68    "Data Source: SentinelOne",
 69    "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
 70    "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
 71    "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", 
 72    "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs"
 73]
 74timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 75type = "eql"
 76
 77query = '''
 78process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.command_line != null and
 79 process.parent.name : "velociraptor.exe" and
 80 process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe") and
 81 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBMAG8AYwBhAGwARwByAG8AdQBwAE0AZQBtAGIAZQBy*") and
 82 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBEAGEAdABl*" and process.command_line : "*-Format*") and
 83 not (process.name : "cmd.exe" and process.command_line : "*start*127.0.0.1:8889*") and
 84 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and process.command_line : "*RwBlAHQALQBJAHQAZQBt*" and process.command_line : "*UgBlAGcAaQBzAHQAcgB5*" and process.command_line : "*UgB1AG4A*") and
 85 not (process.name : "powershell.exe" and
 86      process.args : ("RwBlAHQALQ*", "UgBlAG0AbwB2AGUALQBJAHQAZQBtACA*", "C:\\Program Files\\Velociraptor\\thor.db",
 87                      "import-module \"C:\\Program Files\\Velociraptor\\Tools\\*"))
 88'''
 89
 90
 91[[rule.threat]]
 92framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 93[[rule.threat.technique]]
 94id = "T1219"
 95name = "Remote Access Tools"
 96reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"
 97[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 98id = "T1219.002"
 99name = "Remote Desktop Software"
100reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/"
101
102[rule.threat.tactic]
103id = "TA0011"
104name = "Command and Control"
105reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"