Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host
Identifies a Windows host where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window. Legitimate MSP environments may run multiple tools, but this pattern can also indicate compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access. Processes are mapped to a single vendor label so multiple binaries from the same vendor do not inflate the count.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/03/23"
3integration = [
4 "endpoint",
5 "windows",
6 "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel",
7 "m365_defender",
8 "system",
9 "crowdstrike",
10]
11maturity = "production"
12updated_date = "2026/05/04"
13
14[rule]
15author = ["Elastic"]
16description = """
17Identifies a Windows host where two or more distinct remote monitoring and management (RMM) or remote-access tool
18vendors are observed starting processes within the same eight-minute window. Legitimate MSP environments may run
19multiple tools, but this pattern can also indicate compromise, shadow IT, or attacker staging of redundant access.
20Processes are mapped to a single vendor label so multiple binaries from the same vendor do not inflate the count.
21"""
22from = "now-9m"
23interval = "8m"
24language = "esql"
25license = "Elastic License v2"
26name = "Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host"
27note = """## Triage and analysis
28
29### Investigating Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host
30
31This rule aggregates process start events by `host.id`, host name, and a nine-minute time bucket. Data can come from
32Elastic Defend, Sysmon, Winlogbeat, Windows Security / forwarded events, Microsoft Defender XDR, SentinelOne,
33CrowdStrike FDR, or Elastic Endgame—where ECS process fields are populated. Each known RMM-related process name maps
34to one **vendor** label (e.g. TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect). If **two or more different vendor labels** appear in
35the same bucket, the rule signals.
36
37### Possible investigation steps
38
39- Open **Esql.vendors_seen** and **Esql.processes_name_values** on the alert to see which tools fired in the window.
40- Confirm whether the host is an MSP-managed jump box, helpdesk workstation, or lab where multiple RMM stacks are expected.
41- For servers or standard user endpoints, treat as higher risk: review install source, code signatures, and recent logons.
42- Correlate with other alerts (ingress tool transfer, suspicious scripting, new persistence) on the same `host.id`.
43- Check asset inventory and change tickets for approved RMM software.
44
45### False positive analysis
46
47- **MSP / IT tooling**: A technician machine with two approved agents (e.g. RMM + remote support) may match. Tune with
48 host or organizational unit exceptions, or raise the vendor threshold if your environment standardizes on a known pair.
49- **Vendor rebrands or bundles**: Rare overlaps during migrations can briefly show two vendors; validate timeline and packages.
50
51### Response and remediation
52
53- If unauthorized or unexplained: isolate the host, inventory installed remote-access software, remove unapproved tools,
54 and reset credentials that may have been exposed. Enforce a single approved RMM stack per asset class where possible.
55"""
56
57setup = """## Setup
58
59This rule is designed for data generated by [Elastic Defend](https://www.elastic.co/security/endpoint-security), which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
60
61Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
62
63### Additional data sources
64
65This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:
66
67- [CrowdStrike](https://ela.st/crowdstrike-integration)
68- [Microsoft Defender XDR](https://ela.st/m365-defender)
69- [SentinelOne Cloud Funnel](https://ela.st/sentinel-one-cloud-funnel)
70- [Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation](https://ela.st/sysmon-event-1-setup)
71- [Windows Process Creation Logs](https://ela.st/audit-process-creation)
72"""
73
74references = [
75 "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/",
76 "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-025a",
77]
78risk_score = 47
79rule_id = "c3f8a1d2-4b5e-4c6f-9a8b-1e2d3f4a5b6c"
80severity = "medium"
81tags = [
82 "Domain: Endpoint",
83 "OS: Windows",
84 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
85 "Tactic: Command and Control",
86 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
87 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
88 "Data Source: Sysmon",
89 "Data Source: SentinelOne",
90 "Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR",
91 "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
92 "Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
93 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
94 "Data Source: Winlogbeat",
95]
96timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
97type = "esql"
98
99query = '''
100from logs-endpoint.events.process-*, endgame-*, logs-crowdstrike.fdr*, logs-m365_defender.event-*, logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*, logs-system.security*, logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*, logs-windows.forwarded*, winlogbeat-* metadata _id, _version, _index
101| where (host.os.type == "windows" or host.os.family == "windows")
102 and event.category == "process"
103 and event.type == "start"
104 and process.name is not null
105| eval Esql.rmm_vendor = case(
106 process.name == "AeroAdmin.exe", "AeroAdmin",
107 process.name == "AnyDesk.exe", "AnyDesk",
108 process.name == "AteraAgent.exe", "Atera",
109 process.name == "AweSun.exe", "AweSun",
110 process.name like "aweray_remote*.exe", "AweSun",
111 process.name == "apc_Admin.exe", "APC",
112 process.name == "apc_host.exe", "APC",
113 process.name == "BASupSrvc.exe", "BeyondTrust",
114 process.name == "bomgar-scc.exe", "BeyondTrust",
115 process.name == "Remote Support.exe", "BeyondTrust",
116 process.name == "B4-Service.exe", "BeyondTrust",
117 process.name == "CagService.exe", "BarracudaRMM",
118 process.name == "domotzagent.exe", "Domotz",
119 process.name == "domotz-windows-x64-10.exe", "Domotz",
120 process.name == "dwagsvc.exe", "DWService",
121 process.name == "DWRCC.exe", "DWService",
122 process.name like "fleetdeck_commander*.exe", "FleetDeck",
123 process.name == "getscreen.exe", "GetScreen",
124 process.name == "g2aservice.exe", "GoTo",
125 process.name == "GoToAssistService.exe", "GoTo",
126 process.name == "gotohttp.exe", "GoTo",
127 process.name == "GoToResolveProcessChecker.exe", "GoTo",
128 process.name == "GoToResolveUnattended.exe", "GoTo",
129 process.name == "ImperoClientSVC.exe", "Impero",
130 process.name == "ImperoServerSVC.exe", "Impero",
131 process.name == "ISLLight.exe", "ISLOnline",
132 process.name == "ISLLightClient.exe", "ISLOnline",
133 process.name == "jumpcloud-agent.exe", "JumpCloud",
134 process.name == "level.exe", "Level",
135 process.name == "LvAgent.exe", "Level",
136 process.name == "LMIIgnition.exe", "LogMeIn",
137 process.name == "LogMeIn.exe", "LogMeIn",
138 process.name == "Lunixar.exe", "Lunixar",
139 process.name == "LunixarRemote.exe", "Lunixar",
140 process.name == "LunixarUpdater.exe", "Lunixar",
141 process.name == "ManageEngine_Remote_Access_Plus.exe", "ManageEngine",
142 process.name == "MeshAgent.exe", "MeshCentral",
143 process.name == "meshagent.exe", "MeshCentral",
144 process.name == "Mikogo-Service.exe", "Mikogo",
145 process.name == "NinjaRMMAgent.exe", "NinjaOne",
146 process.name == "NinjaRMMAgenPatcher.exe", "NinjaOne",
147 process.name == "ninjarmm-cli.exe", "NinjaOne",
148 process.name == "parsec.exe", "Parsec",
149 process.name == "PService.exe", "Pulseway",
150 process.name == "r_server.exe", "Radmin",
151 process.name == "radmin.exe", "Radmin",
152 process.name == "radmin3.exe", "Radmin",
153 process.name == "rserver3.exe", "Radmin",
154 process.name == "vncserver.exe", "RealVNC",
155 process.name == "vncviewer.exe", "RealVNC",
156 process.name == "winvnc.exe", "RealVNC",
157 process.name == "ROMServer.exe", "RealVNC",
158 process.name == "ROMViewer.exe", "RealVNC",
159 process.name == "RemotePC.exe", "RemotePC",
160 process.name == "RemotePCDesktop.exe", "RemotePC",
161 process.name == "RemotePCService.exe", "RemotePC",
162 process.name == "RemoteDesktopManager.exe", "Devolutions",
163 process.name == "RCClient.exe", "RPCSuite",
164 process.name == "RCService.exe", "RPCSuite",
165 process.name == "RPCSuite.exe", "RPCSuite",
166 process.name == "rustdesk.exe", "RustDesk",
167 process.name == "rutserv.exe", "RemoteUtilities",
168 process.name == "rutview.exe", "RemoteUtilities",
169 process.name == "saazapsc.exe", "Kaseya",
170 process.name like "ScreenConnect*.exe", "ScreenConnect",
171 process.name == "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect",
172 process.name == "Splashtop-streamer.exe", "Splashtop",
173 process.name == "strwinclt.exe", "Splashtop",
174 process.name == "SRService.exe", "Splashtop",
175 process.name == "smpcview.exe", "Splashtop",
176 process.name == "spclink.exe", "Splashtop",
177 process.name == "rfusclient.exe", "Splashtop",
178 process.name == "Supremo.exe", "Supremo",
179 process.name == "SupremoService.exe", "Supremo",
180 process.name == "Syncro.Overmind.Service.exe", "Splashtop",
181 process.name == "SyncroLive.Agent.Runner.exe", "Splashtop",
182 process.name == "Syncro.Installer.exe", "Splashtop",
183 process.name == "tacticalrmm.exe", "TacticalRMM",
184 process.name == "tailscale.exe", "Tailscale",
185 process.name == "tailscaled.exe", "Tailscale",
186 process.name == "teamviewer.exe", "TeamViewer",
187 process.name == "ticlientcore.exe", "Tiflux",
188 process.name == "TiAgent.exe", "Tiflux",
189 process.name == "ToDesk_Service.exe", "ToDesk",
190 process.name == "twingate.exe", "Twingate",
191 process.name == "tvn.exe", "TightVNC",
192 process.name == "tvnserver.exe", "TightVNC",
193 process.name == "tvnviewer.exe", "TightVNC",
194 process.name == "winwvc.exe", "TightVNC",
195 process.name like "UltraVNC*.exe", "UltraVNC",
196 process.name like "UltraViewer*.exe", "UltraViewer",
197 process.name like "AA_v*.exe", "AnyAssist",
198 process.name == "Velociraptor.exe", "Velociraptor",
199 process.name == "ToolsIQ.exe", "ToolsIQ",
200 process.name == "session_win.exe", "ZohoAssist",
201 process.name == "Zaservice.exe", "ZohoAssist",
202 process.name == "ZohoURS.exe", "ZohoAssist",
203 ""
204 )
205| where Esql.rmm_vendor != "" and Esql.rmm_vendor is not NULL
206| stats Esql.vendor_count = count_distinct(Esql.rmm_vendor),
207 Esql.vendors_seen = values(Esql.rmm_vendor),
208 Esql.processes_executable_values = values(process.executable),
209 Esql.first_seen = min(@timestamp),
210 Esql.last_seen = max(@timestamp)
211 by host.name, host.id
212| where Esql.vendor_count >= 2
213| sort Esql.vendor_count desc
214| keep host.id, host.name, Esql.*
215'''
216
217[[rule.threat]]
218framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
219
220[[rule.threat.technique]]
221id = "T1219"
222name = "Remote Access Tools"
223reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"
224
225[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
226id = "T1219.002"
227name = "Remote Desktop Software"
228reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/002/"
229
230[rule.threat.tactic]
231id = "TA0011"
232name = "Command and Control"
233reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Multiple Remote Management Tool Vendors on Same Host
This rule aggregates process start events by host.id, host name, and a nine-minute time bucket. Data can come from
Elastic Defend, Sysmon, Winlogbeat, Windows Security / forwarded events, Microsoft Defender XDR, SentinelOne,
CrowdStrike FDR, or Elastic Endgame—where ECS process fields are populated. Each known RMM-related process name maps
to one vendor label (e.g. TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect). If two or more different vendor labels appear in
the same bucket, the rule signals.
Possible investigation steps
- Open Esql.vendors_seen and Esql.processes_name_values on the alert to see which tools fired in the window.
- Confirm whether the host is an MSP-managed jump box, helpdesk workstation, or lab where multiple RMM stacks are expected.
- For servers or standard user endpoints, treat as higher risk: review install source, code signatures, and recent logons.
- Correlate with other alerts (ingress tool transfer, suspicious scripting, new persistence) on the same
host.id. - Check asset inventory and change tickets for approved RMM software.
False positive analysis
- MSP / IT tooling: A technician machine with two approved agents (e.g. RMM + remote support) may match. Tune with host or organizational unit exceptions, or raise the vendor threshold if your environment standardizes on a known pair.
- Vendor rebrands or bundles: Rare overlaps during migrations can briefly show two vendors; validate timeline and packages.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized or unexplained: isolate the host, inventory installed remote-access software, remove unapproved tools, and reset credentials that may have been exposed. Enforce a single approved RMM stack per asset class where possible.
References
Related rules
- Attempt to Establish VScode Remote Tunnel
- Potential File Transfer via Certreq
- Potential File Transfer via Curl for Windows
- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Cloudflared
- Potential Protocol Tunneling via Yuze