FortiGate Super Admin Account Creation

This rule detects the creation of an administrator account on a FortiGate device. Administrator account creation on these devices should be infrequent and tightly controlled. In the FG-IR-26-060 campaign, threat actors created super_admin accounts immediately after gaining initial access via FortiCloud SSO bypass to establish persistence.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

 1[metadata]
 2creation_date = "2026/01/28"
 3integration = ["fortinet_fortigate"]
 4maturity = "production"
 5updated_date = "2026/01/28"
 6
 7[rule]
 8author = ["Elastic"]
 9description = """
10This rule detects the creation of an administrator account on a FortiGate device. Administrator account creation on
11these devices should be infrequent and tightly controlled. In the FG-IR-26-060 campaign, threat actors created
12super_admin accounts immediately after gaining initial access via FortiCloud SSO bypass to establish persistence.
13"""
14from = "now-9m"
15interval = "5m"
16index = ["logs-fortinet_fortigate.*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "FortiGate Super Admin Account Creation"
20note = """## Triage and analysis
21
22### Investigating FortiGate Super Admin Account Creation
23
24This alert indicates that an administrator account was created on a FortiGate device. Administrator creation events on these devices are generally rare and should be closely scrutinized, as they are a key persistence mechanism used in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.
25
26In the observed campaign, threat actors created multiple super_admin accounts (audit, backup, support, itadmin, secadmin, remoteadmin) within seconds of initial access to ensure persistent control even if individual accounts are discovered and removed.
27
28### Possible investigation steps
29
30- Review `fortinet.firewall.cfgobj` for the name of the newly created account and examine `fortinet.firewall.cfgattr` to determine the access profile assigned to the account (especially super_admin).
31- Review `source.user.name` to determine which account performed the creation and `fortinet.firewall.ui` for the source interface and IP address. Verify whether this administrator is authorized to provision accounts.
32- Check whether a login event (especially via SSO) occurred shortly before the account creation. Analyze the timing between events.
33- Check `observer.name` to identify the FortiGate device and run `get system admin` to get the current administrator list. Check other FortiGate devices in the fleet for the same account name.
34
35### False positive analysis
36
37- Authorized provisioning of a new administrator account through an approved change management process.
38- Initial device setup where administrator accounts are created as part of deployment.
39- Migration or device replacement scenarios where accounts are replicated from another device.
40
41### Response and remediation
42
43- If unauthorized, delete the administrator account immediately and audit the creating account for compromise.
44- Treat the device configuration as compromised and restore from a known-clean backup.
45- Check all FortiGate devices for similar account creation and upgrade FortiOS to a patched version.
46- If the activity is expected, document the provisioning activity and the business justification."""
47references = [
48    "https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060",
49    "https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios",
50    "https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/fortinet_fortigate",
51    "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/01/28/fortinet-releases-guidance-address-ongoing-exploitation-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026",
52]
53risk_score = 47
54rule_id = "cbbe0523-33f3-4420-b88d-5c940d9e72c1"
55severity = "medium"
56tags = [
57    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
58    "Tactic: Persistence",
59    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
60    "Domain: Network",
61    "Domain: Identity",
62    "Data Source: Fortinet",
63    "Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate",
64]
65timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
66type = "eql"
67
68query = '''
69any where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
70    event.code == "0100044547" and
71    fortinet.firewall.cfgpath == "system.admin" and
72    fortinet.firewall.action == "Add" and
73    fortinet.firewall.cfgattr like~ "*accprofile[super_admin]*"
74'''
75
76
77[[rule.threat]]
78framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
79[[rule.threat.technique]]
80id = "T1136"
81name = "Create Account"
82reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/"
83[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
84id = "T1136.001"
85name = "Local Account"
86reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/"
87
88
89
90[rule.threat.tactic]
91id = "TA0003"
92name = "Persistence"
93reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

Triage and analysis

Investigating FortiGate Super Admin Account Creation

This alert indicates that an administrator account was created on a FortiGate device. Administrator creation events on these devices are generally rare and should be closely scrutinized, as they are a key persistence mechanism used in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.

In the observed campaign, threat actors created multiple super_admin accounts (audit, backup, support, itadmin, secadmin, remoteadmin) within seconds of initial access to ensure persistent control even if individual accounts are discovered and removed.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review fortinet.firewall.cfgobj for the name of the newly created account and examine fortinet.firewall.cfgattr to determine the access profile assigned to the account (especially super_admin).
  • Review source.user.name to determine which account performed the creation and fortinet.firewall.ui for the source interface and IP address. Verify whether this administrator is authorized to provision accounts.
  • Check whether a login event (especially via SSO) occurred shortly before the account creation. Analyze the timing between events.
  • Check observer.name to identify the FortiGate device and run get system admin to get the current administrator list. Check other FortiGate devices in the fleet for the same account name.

False positive analysis

  • Authorized provisioning of a new administrator account through an approved change management process.
  • Initial device setup where administrator accounts are created as part of deployment.
  • Migration or device replacement scenarios where accounts are replicated from another device.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, delete the administrator account immediately and audit the creating account for compromise.
  • Treat the device configuration as compromised and restore from a known-clean backup.
  • Check all FortiGate devices for similar account creation and upgrade FortiOS to a patched version.
  • If the activity is expected, document the provisioning activity and the business justification.

References

Related rules

to-top