Potential Execution via XZBackdoor

It identifies potential malicious shell executions through remote SSH and detects cases where the sshd service suddenly terminates soon after successful execution, suggesting suspicious behavior similar to the XZ backdoor.

Elastic rule (View on GitHub)

  1[metadata]
  2creation_date = "2024/04/01"
  3integration = ["endpoint"]
  4maturity = "production"
  5updated_date = "2024/09/23"
  6
  7[rule]
  8author = ["Elastic"]
  9description = """
 10It identifies potential malicious shell executions through remote SSH and detects cases where the sshd service suddenly
 11terminates soon after successful execution, suggesting suspicious behavior similar to the XZ backdoor.
 12"""
 13from = "now-9m"
 14index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
 15language = "eql"
 16license = "Elastic License v2"
 17name = "Potential Execution via XZBackdoor"
 18references = [
 19    "https://github.com/amlweems/xzbot",
 20    "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-3094",
 21    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/500ms-to-midnight",
 22]
 23risk_score = 73
 24rule_id = "7afc6cc9-8800-4c7f-be6b-b688d2dea248"
 25severity = "high"
 26tags = [
 27    "Domain: Endpoint",
 28    "OS: Linux",
 29    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
 30    "Tactic: Credential Access",
 31    "Tactic: Persistence",
 32    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
 33    "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
 34]
 35timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 36type = "eql"
 37
 38query = '''
 39sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=1s
 40 [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name == "sshd" and
 41    process.args == "-D" and process.args == "-R"] by process.pid, process.entity_id
 42 [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.parent.name == "sshd" and 
 43  process.executable != null and 
 44  not process.executable in ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd", "/usr/bin/google_authorized_keys", "/usr/bin/fipscheck") and 
 45  process.command_line != "sh -c /usr/bin/env -i PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin run-parts --lsbsysinit /etc/update-motd.d > /run/motd.dynamic.new"] by process.parent.pid, process.parent.entity_id
 46 [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "end" and process.name == "sshd" and process.exit_code != 0] by process.pid, process.entity_id
 47 [network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "end" and event.action == "disconnect_received" and process.name == "sshd"] by process.pid, process.entity_id
 48'''
 49
 50
 51[[rule.threat]]
 52framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 53[[rule.threat.technique]]
 54id = "T1543"
 55name = "Create or Modify System Process"
 56reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
 57
 58
 59[rule.threat.tactic]
 60id = "TA0003"
 61name = "Persistence"
 62reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
 63[[rule.threat]]
 64framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 65[[rule.threat.technique]]
 66id = "T1556"
 67name = "Modify Authentication Process"
 68reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
 69
 70
 71[rule.threat.tactic]
 72id = "TA0006"
 73name = "Credential Access"
 74reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
 75[[rule.threat]]
 76framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
 77[[rule.threat.technique]]
 78id = "T1021"
 79name = "Remote Services"
 80reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
 81[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 82id = "T1021.004"
 83name = "SSH"
 84reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/"
 85
 86
 87[[rule.threat.technique]]
 88id = "T1563"
 89name = "Remote Service Session Hijacking"
 90reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/"
 91[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
 92id = "T1563.001"
 93name = "SSH Hijacking"
 94reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/001/"
 95
 96
 97
 98[rule.threat.tactic]
 99id = "TA0008"
100name = "Lateral Movement"
101reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"

References

Related rules

to-top