Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation
This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a backdoor script or command.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2023/02/28"
3integration = ["endpoint"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/09/23"
6
7[transform]
8[[transform.osquery]]
9label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Information"
10query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path = {{file.path}}"
11
12[[transform.osquery]]
13label = "Osquery - Retrieve File Listing Information"
14query = "SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'"
15
16[[transform.osquery]]
17label = "Osquery - Retrieve Additional File Listing Information"
18query = """
19SELECT f.path, u.username AS file_owner, g.groupname AS group_owner, datetime(f.atime, 'unixepoch') AS
20file_last_access_time, datetime(f.mtime, 'unixepoch') AS file_last_modified_time, datetime(f.ctime, 'unixepoch') AS
21file_last_status_change_time, datetime(f.btime, 'unixepoch') AS file_created_time, f.size AS size_bytes FROM file f LEFT
22JOIN users u ON f.uid = u.uid LEFT JOIN groups g ON f.gid = g.gid WHERE path LIKE '/etc/update-motd.d/%'
23"""
24
25[[transform.osquery]]
26label = "Osquery - Retrieve Running Processes by User"
27query = "SELECT pid, username, name FROM processes p JOIN users u ON u.uid = p.uid ORDER BY username"
28
29[[transform.osquery]]
30label = "Osquery - Retrieve Crontab Information"
31query = "SELECT * FROM crontab"
32
33
34[rule]
35author = ["Elastic"]
36description = """
37This rule detects the creation of potentially malicious files within the default MOTD file directories. Message of the
38day (MOTD) is the message that is presented to the user when a user connects to a Linux server via SSH or a serial
39connection. Linux systems contain several default MOTD files located in the "/etc/update-motd.d/" directory. These
40scripts run as the root user every time a user connects over SSH or a serial connection. Adversaries may create
41malicious MOTD files that grant them persistence onto the target every time a user connects to the system by executing a
42backdoor script or command.
43"""
44from = "now-9m"
45index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*"]
46language = "eql"
47license = "Elastic License v2"
48name = "Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation"
49note = """## Triage and analysis
50
51### Investigating Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation
52
53The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
54
55Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory. Executable files in these directories automatically run with root privileges.
56
57This rule identifies the creation of new files within the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory.
58
59> **Note**:
60> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
61> This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
62
63#### Possible Investigation Steps
64
65- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
66 - $osquery_0
67- Investigate whether any other files in the `/etc/update-motd.d/` directory have been altered.
68 - $osquery_1
69 - $osquery_2
70- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
71 - $osquery_3
72- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
73- Investigate whether the modified scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
74 - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
75 - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
76 - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
77 - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
78 - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
79 - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
80 - File access, modification, and creation activities.
81 - Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
82 - $osquery_4
83
84### Related Rules
85
86- Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) - 4ec47004-b34a-42e6-8003-376a123ea447
87
88### False positive analysis
89
90- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
91
92### Response and remediation
93
94- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
95- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
96- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
97 - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
98 - Stop suspicious processes.
99 - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
100 - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
101- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
102- Delete the MOTD files or restore their original configuration.
103- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
104- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
105- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
106"""
107references = [
108 "https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/02/06/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-initialization-scripts-and-shell-configuration/#10-boot-or-logon-initialization-scripts-motd",
109 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms",
110]
111risk_score = 47
112rule_id = "96d11d31-9a79-480f-8401-da28b194608f"
113setup = """## Setup
114
115This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
116
117### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
118Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
119
120#### Prerequisite Requirements:
121- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
122- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
123
124#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
125- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
126- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
127- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
128- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
129- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
130- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
131- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
132- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
133For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
134- Click "Save and Continue".
135- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
136For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
137"""
138severity = "medium"
139tags = [
140 "Domain: Endpoint",
141 "OS: Linux",
142 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
143 "Tactic: Persistence",
144 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
145 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
146]
147timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
148type = "eql"
149
150query = '''
151file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
152file.path : "/etc/update-motd.d/*" and not (
153 process.executable in (
154 "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
155 "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
156 "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
157 "/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/pacman", "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
158 "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/usr/sbin/pacman", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
159 "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
160 "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
161 "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd"
162 ) or
163 file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
164 file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
165 process.executable : (
166 "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*"
167 ) or
168 process.executable == null or
169 (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
170 (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*")
171)
172'''
173
174
175[[rule.threat]]
176framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
177[[rule.threat.technique]]
178id = "T1037"
179name = "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"
180reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/"
181
182
183[rule.threat.tactic]
184id = "TA0003"
185name = "Persistence"
186reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) File Creation
The message-of-the-day (MOTD) is used to display a customizable system-wide message or information to users upon login in Linux.
Attackers can abuse message-of-the-day (motd) files to run scripts, commands or malicious software every time a user connects to a system over SSH or a serial connection, by creating a new file within the /etc/update-motd.d/
directory. Executable files in these directories automatically run with root privileges.
This rule identifies the creation of new files within the /etc/update-motd.d/
directory.
Note: This investigation guide uses the Osquery Markdown Plugin introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. This investigation guide uses placeholder fields to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.
Possible Investigation Steps
- Investigate the file that was created or modified.
- $osquery_0
- Investigate whether any other files in the
/etc/update-motd.d/
directory have been altered.- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
- $osquery_3
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Investigate whether the modified scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
- If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
- Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
- Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
- File access, modification, and creation activities.
- Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
- $osquery_4
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities:
- Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
- If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
Related Rules
- Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD) - 4ec47004-b34a-42e6-8003-376a123ea447
False positive analysis
- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.
Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Delete the MOTD files or restore their original configuration.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
References
Related rules
- Potential Linux Backdoor User Account Creation
- rc.local/rc.common File Creation
- Process Spawned from Message-of-the-Day (MOTD)
- Potential Remote Code Execution via Web Server
- At Job Created or Modified