Kubernetes Static Pod Manifest File Access
Detects Linux process executions where shells, editors, interpreters, or file/stream utilities reference /etc/kubernetes/manifests in process arguments. That directory holds static pod manifests read by the kubelet; interaction via editors, downloaders, kubectl, redirection helpers (tee, dd), or scripting runtimes may indicate staging or tampering with manifests for persistence or privileged workload placement. Pairs with file-telemetry rules that flag direct manifest creation on container workloads.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/05/06"
3integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/06"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects Linux process executions where shells, editors, interpreters, or file/stream utilities reference
11/etc/kubernetes/manifests in process arguments. That directory holds static pod manifests read by the kubelet;
12interaction via editors, downloaders, kubectl, redirection helpers (tee, dd), or scripting runtimes may indicate
13staging or tampering with manifests for persistence or privileged workload placement. Pairs with file-telemetry rules
14that flag direct manifest creation on container workloads.
15"""
16false_positives = [
17 """
18 Cluster provisioning (kubeadm), configuration management, or administrators editing manifests during maintenance may
19 match. Baseline approved automation and interactive admin sessions on control plane nodes.
20 """,
21]
22from = "now-9m"
23index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
24language = "kuery"
25license = "Elastic License v2"
26name = "Kubernetes Static Pod Manifest File Access"
27note = """## Triage and analysis
28
29### Investigating Kubernetes Static Pod Manifest File Access
30
31Review the full command line (process.args, process.command_line), user.id, user.name, process.parent, and whether the
32session was interactive. Confirm if the host is a Kubernetes node or admin jump host where manifest edits are expected.
33
34### Possible investigation steps
35
36- Compare activity to change windows and identity baselines; prioritize events without matching change tickets.
37- Inspect subsequent process and file events on the same host for writes under /etc/kubernetes/manifests or kubelet
38 restarts.
39- Correlate with Kubernetes audit logs and node/agent telemetry for related compromise indicators.
40
41### Response and remediation
42
43- If unauthorized, restore manifests from known-good sources, isolate the host, and review cluster integrity per incident
44 policy.
45"""
46references = [
47 "https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/static-pod/",
48 "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007/",
49]
50risk_score = 47
51rule_id = "a698a653-e144-4e40-bade-35135935be45"
52setup = """## Setup
53
54Requires **Elastic Defend** and/or **Auditd Manager** process telemetry (`logs-endpoint.events.process*`,
55`logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*`, `auditbeat-*`) with command-line argument capture for exec events.
56
57### Elastic Defend
58Install the Elastic Defend integration via Fleet on Linux hosts and use a policy that collects process events with
59arguments.
60
61### Auditd Manager
62Deploy Auditd Manager and ensure execve (or equivalent process) auditing is enabled so `process.args` and
63`process.executable` populate for monitored binaries.
64
65See https://docs.elastic.co/integrations/auditd_manager
66"""
67severity = "medium"
68tags = [
69 "Data Source: Auditd Manager",
70 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
71 "Domain: Endpoint",
72 "Domain: Kubernetes",
73 "Domain: Container",
74 "OS: Linux",
75 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
76 "Tactic: Persistence",
77 "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
78 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
79]
80timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
81type = "query"
82query = '''
83host.os.type:linux and event.category:process and event.action:(exec or executed) and
84process.name:(
85 bash or sh or dash or zsh or
86 cat or cp or mv or touch or tee or dd or
87 sed or awk or
88 curl or wget or scp or
89 vi or vim or nano or echo or
90 busybox or
91 python* or perl* or ruby* or node or lua* or
92 openssl or base64 or xxd or
93 .*) and
94 process.args:(*/etc/kubernetes/manifests/* and not (/etc/kubernetes/manifests/etcd* or /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-apiserver* or /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-scheduler* or /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-controller-manager*))
95'''
96
97[[rule.threat]]
98framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
99
100[[rule.threat.technique]]
101id = "T1053"
102name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
103reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
104
105[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
106id = "T1053.007"
107name = "Container Orchestration Job"
108reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007/"
109
110[rule.threat.tactic]
111id = "TA0003"
112name = "Persistence"
113reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
114
115[[rule.threat]]
116framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
117
118[[rule.threat.technique]]
119id = "T1543"
120name = "Create or Modify System Process"
121reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
122
123[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
124id = "T1543.005"
125name = "Container Service"
126reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/005/"
127
128[rule.threat.tactic]
129id = "TA0004"
130name = "Privilege Escalation"
131reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Kubernetes Static Pod Manifest File Access
Review the full command line (process.args, process.command_line), user.id, user.name, process.parent, and whether the session was interactive. Confirm if the host is a Kubernetes node or admin jump host where manifest edits are expected.
Possible investigation steps
- Compare activity to change windows and identity baselines; prioritize events without matching change tickets.
- Inspect subsequent process and file events on the same host for writes under /etc/kubernetes/manifests or kubelet restarts.
- Correlate with Kubernetes audit logs and node/agent telemetry for related compromise indicators.
Response and remediation
- If unauthorized, restore manifests from known-good sources, isolate the host, and review cluster integrity per incident policy.
References
Related rules
- Pod or Container Creation with Suspicious Command-Line
- Kubectl Secrets Enumeration Across All Namespaces
- Kubelet API Connection Attempt to Internal IP
- Potential Direct Kubelet Access via Process Arguments
- Potential Kubeletctl Execution