ESXi Payload Executed Against Datastore
Detects a program launched from the ESXi shell against /vmfs/volumes. The datastore holds the virtual disks of
every guest. A process pointed at that path can read or encrypt those disks and take the hosted virtual machines
offline.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/30"
3integration = ["vsphere"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/30"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects a program launched from the ESXi shell against `/vmfs/volumes`. The datastore holds the virtual disks of
11every guest. A process pointed at that path can read or encrypt those disks and take the hosted virtual machines
12offline.
13"""
14false_positives = [
15 """
16 A support script stored under `/tmp` or a Python inventory check can be pointed at a datastore during
17maintenance. Confirm the file name, the account, and whether virtual machines were shut down in the same session.
18 """,
19]
20from = "now-9m"
21index = ["logs-vsphere.log-*"]
22language = "kuery"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "ESXi Payload Executed Against Datastore"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating ESXi Payload Executed Against Datastore
28
29This is the launch command. A path under /tmp, or python, is invoked with /vmfs/volumes as an argument. Ragnar Locker uses /tmp/<filename> /vmfs/volumes/<UUID>/. Pysa uses Python and passes the datastore path.
30
31#### Possible investigation steps
32
33- Read message for the executable path and the datastore argument.
34- Check the same session for chmod +x, VM process kills, snapshot removal, and find commands for vmdk files.
35- On the host, identify the file that was executed and whether it is still under /tmp or on a datastore.
36
37### False positive analysis
38
39Approved maintenance can run a known script from /tmp against a datastore. An unknown filename, especially after a chmod in the same session, is the ransomware launch pattern.
40
41### Response and remediation
42
43- If the program was not approved, isolate the host. Leave powered-on VMs running so their disks stay locked.
44- Remove the file under /tmp and preserve shell.log.
45- Restore any datastore that was modified from an off-host backup.
46"""
47references = [
48 "https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/#",
49 "https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/esxi-targeting-ransomware-tactics-and-techniques-part-2.html",
50 "https://detect.fyi/vmware-esxi-logging-detection-opportunities-4fb56411ec21",
51]
52setup = """## Setup
53
54This rule requires ESXi host logs collected by the Elastic vSphere integration: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/vsphere
55"""
56risk_score = 73
57rule_id = "4bfd7545-987a-5a19-a3c9-c3fba2858f29"
58severity = "high"
59tags = [
60 "Domain: Endpoint",
61 "Data Source: VMware vSphere",
62 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
63 "Tactic: Execution",
64 "Tactic: Impact",
65 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
66 "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
67 "Platform: VMware ESXi",
68 "Threat: Ransomware",
69]
70timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
71type = "query"
72
73query = '''
74data_stream.dataset:vsphere.log and event.module:vsphere and message:("/vmfs/volumes" and ("/tmp/" or python))
75'''
76
77[[rule.threat]]
78framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
79[[rule.threat.technique]]
80id = "T1059"
81name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
82reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
83[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
84id = "T1059.004"
85name = "Unix Shell"
86reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
87
88[rule.threat.tactic]
89id = "TA0002"
90name = "Execution"
91reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
92
93[[rule.threat]]
94framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
95[[rule.threat.technique]]
96id = "T1486"
97name = "Data Encrypted for Impact"
98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/"
99
100[rule.threat.tactic]
101id = "TA0040"
102name = "Impact"
103reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
104
105[rule.investigation_fields]
106field_names = [
107 "@timestamp",
108 "message",
109 "event.original",
110 "host.hostname",
111 "log.file.path",
112]
Triage and analysis
Investigating ESXi Payload Executed Against Datastore
This is the launch command. A path under /tmp, or python, is invoked with /vmfs/volumes as an argument. Ragnar Locker uses /tmp/
Possible investigation steps
- Read message for the executable path and the datastore argument.
- Check the same session for chmod +x, VM process kills, snapshot removal, and find commands for vmdk files.
- On the host, identify the file that was executed and whether it is still under /tmp or on a datastore.
False positive analysis
Approved maintenance can run a known script from /tmp against a datastore. An unknown filename, especially after a chmod in the same session, is the ransomware launch pattern.
Response and remediation
- If the program was not approved, isolate the host. Leave powered-on VMs running so their disks stay locked.
- Remove the file under /tmp and preserve shell.log.
- Restore any datastore that was modified from an off-host backup.
References
Related rules
- ESXi Virtual Machine Powered Off
- ESXi Virtual Machine Process Killed
- ESXi Virtual Machine Snapshot Removed
- ESXi Curl or Wget Activity
- ESXi File Made Executable with chmod