New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin
Detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2023/11/06"
3integration = ["okta"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/09/23"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within
11Okta.
12"""
13from = "now-30m"
14index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-okta*"]
15interval = "15m"
16language = "kuery"
17license = "Elastic License v2"
18name = "New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin"
19note = """## Triage and analysis
20
21### Investigating New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin
22
23This rule detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta.
24
25#### Possible investigation steps:
26- Identify the actor associated with the IdP creation by examining the `okta.actor.id`, `okta.actor.type`, `okta.actor.alternate_id`, and `okta.actor.display_name` fields.
27- Identify the IdP added by reviewing the `okta.target` field and determing if this IdP is authorized.
28- Determine the client used by the actor. Review the `okta.client.ip`, `okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent`, `okta.client.zone`, `okta.client.device`, and `okta.client.id` fields.
29- If the client is a device, check the `okta.device.id`, `okta.device.name`, `okta.device.os_platform`, `okta.device.os_version`, and `okta.device.managed` fields.
30- Review the past activities of the actor involved in this action by checking their previous actions logged in the `okta.target` field.
31- Examine the `okta.request.ip_chain` field to potentially determine if the actor used a proxy or VPN to perform this action.
32- Evaluate the actions that happened just before and after this event in the `okta.event_type` field to help understand the full context of the activity.
33
34### False positive analysis:
35- It might be a false positive if the action was part of a planned activity or performed by an authorized person.
36- Several unsuccessful attempts prior to this success, may indicate an adversary attempting to add an unauthorized IdP multiple times.
37
38### Response and remediation:
39- If the IdP is unauthorized, deactivate it immediately via the Okta console.
40- If the IdP is authorized, ensure that the actor who created it is authorized to do so.
41- If the actor is unauthorized, deactivate their account via the Okta console.
42- If the actor is authorized, ensure that the actor's account is not compromised.
43- Reset the user's password and enforce MFA re-enrollment, if applicable.
44- Block the IP address or device used in the attempts if they appear suspicious, using the data from the `okta.client.ip` and `okta.device.id` fields.
45- Conduct a review of Okta policies and ensure they are in accordance with security best practices.
46- If the deactivated IdP was crucial to the organization, consider adding a new IdP and removing the unauthorized IdP.
47
48## Setup
49
50The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
51"""
52references = [
53 "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-investigation-of-the-january-2022-okta-compromise/",
54 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy",
55 "https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection",
56 "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/muddled-libra/",
57 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security",
58 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta",
59]
60risk_score = 47
61rule_id = "29b53942-7cd4-11ee-b70e-f661ea17fbcd"
62severity = "medium"
63tags = ["Use Case: Identity and Access Audit", "Tactic: Persistence", "Data Source: Okta"]
64timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
65type = "query"
66
67query = '''
68event.dataset: "okta.system" and event.action: "system.idp.lifecycle.create" and okta.outcome.result: "SUCCESS"
69'''
70
71
72[[rule.threat]]
73framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
74[[rule.threat.technique]]
75id = "T1556"
76name = "Modify Authentication Process"
77reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
78[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
79id = "T1556.007"
80name = "Hybrid Identity"
81reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007/"
82
83
84
85[rule.threat.tactic]
86id = "TA0003"
87name = "Persistence"
88reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating New Okta Identity Provider (IdP) Added by Admin
This rule detects the creation of a new Identity Provider (IdP) by a Super Administrator or Organization Administrator within Okta.
Possible investigation steps:
- Identify the actor associated with the IdP creation by examining the
okta.actor.id
,okta.actor.type
,okta.actor.alternate_id
, andokta.actor.display_name
fields. - Identify the IdP added by reviewing the
okta.target
field and determing if this IdP is authorized. - Determine the client used by the actor. Review the
okta.client.ip
,okta.client.user_agent.raw_user_agent
,okta.client.zone
,okta.client.device
, andokta.client.id
fields. - If the client is a device, check the
okta.device.id
,okta.device.name
,okta.device.os_platform
,okta.device.os_version
, andokta.device.managed
fields. - Review the past activities of the actor involved in this action by checking their previous actions logged in the
okta.target
field. - Examine the
okta.request.ip_chain
field to potentially determine if the actor used a proxy or VPN to perform this action. - Evaluate the actions that happened just before and after this event in the
okta.event_type
field to help understand the full context of the activity.
False positive analysis:
- It might be a false positive if the action was part of a planned activity or performed by an authorized person.
- Several unsuccessful attempts prior to this success, may indicate an adversary attempting to add an unauthorized IdP multiple times.
Response and remediation:
- If the IdP is unauthorized, deactivate it immediately via the Okta console.
- If the IdP is authorized, ensure that the actor who created it is authorized to do so.
- If the actor is unauthorized, deactivate their account via the Okta console.
- If the actor is authorized, ensure that the actor's account is not compromised.
- Reset the user's password and enforce MFA re-enrollment, if applicable.
- Block the IP address or device used in the attempts if they appear suspicious, using the data from the
okta.client.ip
andokta.device.id
fields. - Conduct a review of Okta policies and ensure they are in accordance with security best practices.
- If the deactivated IdP was crucial to the organization, consider adding a new IdP and removing the unauthorized IdP.
Setup
The Okta Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
References
Related rules
- Administrator Privileges Assigned to an Okta Group
- Administrator Role Assigned to an Okta User
- Attempt to Create Okta API Token
- Attempt to Reset MFA Factors for an Okta User Account
- Modification or Removal of an Okta Application Sign-On Policy