Anthropic Organization Deletion
Organization deletion and bulk delete remove tenant data, projects, and member access in a single administrative action. An attacker can use this to break AI-assisted workflows as an impact technique, to extort the organization, or to destroy evidence after finishing a data export. Once deletion progresses, recovery options shrink and earlier exfiltration activity is harder to reconstruct from the tenant itself.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/09/12"
3integration = ["anthropic"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/09/21"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Organization deletion and bulk delete remove tenant data, projects, and member access in a single administrative
11action. An attacker can use this to break AI-assisted workflows as an impact technique, to extort the organization, or
12to destroy evidence after finishing a data export. Once deletion progresses, recovery options shrink and earlier
13exfiltration activity is harder to reconstruct from the tenant itself.
14"""
15false_positives = [
16 """
17 Planned tenant offboarding, sandbox teardown, or contract termination can produce these events. Confirm the actor
18 and timing against change management or offboarding records before escalating.
19 """,
20]
21from = "now-9m"
22language = "esql"
23license = "Elastic License v2"
24name = "Anthropic Organization Deletion"
25note = """## Triage and analysis
26
27### Investigating Anthropic Organization Deletion
28
29Organization deletion / bulk delete removes tenant data, projects, and member access. Treat early actions as urgent —
30recovery options shrink as the workflow progresses.
31
32Unauthorized = no offboarding / lab-teardown ticket naming this org and actor, or deletion preceded by owner transfer,
33admin grants, key creation, or data exports without a matching business project.
34
35#### Possible investigation steps
36
37- Identify actor (`user_actor` → email/IP/UA) and `organization.id`.
38- Urgency by action:
39 - `org_deletion_requested`: intervene immediately if unauthorized.
40 - `org_bulk_delete_initiated`: bulk delete started — escalate IR now.
41 - `org_deleted_via_bulk`: completed — prioritize evidence preservation outside the tenant.
42- Look for preceding primary owner transfer, admin grants, admin API key creation, or data exports.
43- Close as FP only when platform owners confirm scheduled decommission with matching ticket/time/actor.
44
45### False positive analysis
46
47- Sandbox teardown and contract termination are valid — require change management or offboarding records.
48
49### Response and remediation
50
51- On unauthorized activity: engage Anthropic support and internal IR immediately, preserve remaining audit logs
52 (including prior exports), and rotate administrative credentials for the organization.
53"""
54references = [
55 "https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/compliance/activities/list",
56]
57risk_score = 99
58rule_id = "11347993-e71f-4659-a903-e9a0e8bd55de"
59severity = "critical"
60tags = [
61 "Domain: GenAI",
62 "Platform: Anthropic",
63 "Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs",
64 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
65 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
66 "Rule Type: ES|QL",
67 "Tactic: Impact",
68]
69timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
70type = "esql"
71
72query = '''
73from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
74| where
75 data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
76 mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
77 event.action in ("org_deletion_requested", "org_bulk_delete_initiated", "org_deleted_via_bulk")
78| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
79'''
80
81
82[[rule.threat]]
83framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
84[[rule.threat.technique]]
85id = "T1485"
86name = "Data Destruction"
87reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/"
88
89[[rule.threat.technique]]
90id = "T1531"
91name = "Account Access Removal"
92reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
93
94
95[rule.threat.tactic]
96id = "TA0040"
97name = "Impact"
98reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
99
100[rule.investigation_fields]
101field_names = [
102 "@timestamp",
103 "event.action",
104 "event.id",
105 "organization.id",
106 "anthropic.audit.actor.type",
107 "user.email",
108 "user.id",
109 "source.ip",
110 "user_agent.original",
111]
Triage and analysis
Investigating Anthropic Organization Deletion
Organization deletion / bulk delete removes tenant data, projects, and member access. Treat early actions as urgent — recovery options shrink as the workflow progresses.
Unauthorized = no offboarding / lab-teardown ticket naming this org and actor, or deletion preceded by owner transfer, admin grants, key creation, or data exports without a matching business project.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify actor (
user_actor→ email/IP/UA) andorganization.id. - Urgency by action:
org_deletion_requested: intervene immediately if unauthorized.org_bulk_delete_initiated: bulk delete started — escalate IR now.org_deleted_via_bulk: completed — prioritize evidence preservation outside the tenant.
- Look for preceding primary owner transfer, admin grants, admin API key creation, or data exports.
- Close as FP only when platform owners confirm scheduled decommission with matching ticket/time/actor.
False positive analysis
- Sandbox teardown and contract termination are valid — require change management or offboarding records.
Response and remediation
- On unauthorized activity: engage Anthropic support and internal IR immediately, preserve remaining audit logs (including prior exports), and rotate administrative credentials for the organization.
References
Related rules
- Anthropic Admin API Key Deleted
- Anthropic Excessive Chat Creation
- Anthropic Extra Usage Spend Limit Deleted
- Anthropic Activity from a Suspicious User Agent
- Anthropic Admin API Key Created