Brand impersonation: Microsoft with embedded logo and credential theft language
This rule detects messages impersonating Microsoft via a logo and contains credential theft language. From a new and unsolicited sender.
Sublime rule (View on GitHub)
1name: "Brand impersonation: Microsoft with embedded logo and credential theft language"
2description: "This rule detects messages impersonating Microsoft via a logo and contains credential theft language. From a new and unsolicited sender."
3type: "rule"
4severity: "high"
5source: |
6 type.inbound
7 and (
8 (
9 length(attachments) > 0
10 and all(attachments,
11 .file_type in $file_types_images or .file_type == "pdf"
12 )
13 )
14 or length(attachments) == 0
15 )
16 and any(ml.logo_detect(beta.message_screenshot()).brands,
17 strings.starts_with(.name, "Microsoft")
18 )
19 and (
20 any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
21 .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
22 )
23 or (
24 length(body.current_thread.text) == 0
25 and any(file.explode(beta.message_screenshot()),
26 any(ml.nlu_classifier(.scan.ocr.raw).intents,
27 .name == "cred_theft" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
28 )
29 )
30 )
31 )
32 and (
33 not (
34 headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
35 and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain in (
36 "azureadnotifications.us",
37 "microsoft.com",
38 "sharepointonline.com",
39 "cloudappsecurity.com",
40 "microsoftsupport.com",
41 "microsoft.onmicrosoft.com",
42 "yammer.com"
43 )
44 )
45 or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass is null
46 or headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain is null
47 )
48 and (
49 not profile.by_sender().solicited
50 or (
51 profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
52 and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
53 )
54 )
55 and not (
56 sender.email.domain.domain == "planner.office365.com"
57 and headers.return_path.email == "noreply@planner.office365.com"
58 and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.details.from.domain == "planner.office365.com"
59 )
60
61 // message is not from sharepoint actual (additional check in case DMARC check above fails to bail out)
62 and not (
63 strings.ilike(headers.message_id, '<Share-*', '<MassDelete-*')
64 and strings.ends_with(headers.message_id, '@odspnotify>')
65 )
66
67 // negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
68 and (
69 (
70 sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
71 and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
72 )
73 or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
74 )
75 and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives
76
77attack_types:
78 - "Credential Phishing"
79tactics_and_techniques:
80 - "Impersonation: Brand"
81 - "Social engineering"
82detection_methods:
83 - "Computer Vision"
84 - "Natural Language Understanding"
85 - "Sender analysis"
86id: "3ee9ef3d-8ec4-5df0-a8a2-5c6d037eb17a"