COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value

Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.

Sigma rule (View on GitHub)

 1title: COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value
 2id: 790317c0-0a36-4a6a-a105-6e576bf99a14
 3related:
 4    - id: 3d968d17-ffa4-4bc0-bfdc-f139de76ce77
 5      type: obsolete
 6    - id: a0ff33d8-79e4-4cef-b4f3-9dc4133ccd12
 7      type: obsolete
 8status: experimental
 9description: Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.
10references:
11    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/ (idea)
12    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/snipbot-romcom-malware-variant/
13    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-5647-romcom/
14    - https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/darkhotel-a-cluster-of-groups-united-by-common-techniques
15    - https://threatbook.io/blog/Analysis-of-APT-C-60-Attack-on-South-Korea
16author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
17date: 2024-07-16
18modified: 2024-12-14
19tags:
20    - attack.persistence
21    - attack.t1546.015
22logsource:
23    category: registry_set
24    product: windows
25detection:
26    selection_target_root:
27        TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\'
28        TargetObject|endswith:
29            - '\InprocServer32\(Default)'
30            - '\LocalServer32\(Default)'
31    selection_target_builtin_clsid:
32        TargetObject|contains:
33            # Note: Add other legitimate CLSID
34            - '\{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}\'
35            - '\{2155fee3-2419-4373-b102-6843707eb41f}\'
36            - '\{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}\'
37            - '\{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}\'
38            - '\{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}\'
39            - '\{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}\'
40            - '\{F82B4EF1-93A9-4DDE-8015-F7950A1A6E31}\'
41            - '\{7849596a-48ea-486e-8937-a2a3009f31a9}\'
42            - '\{0b91a74b-ad7c-4a9d-b563-29eef9167172}\'
43            - '\{603D3801-BD81-11d0-A3A5-00C04FD706EC}\'
44    selection_susp_location_1:
45        Details|contains:
46            # Note: Add more suspicious paths and locations
47            - ':\Perflogs\'
48            - '\AppData\Local\'
49            - '\Desktop\'
50            - '\Downloads\'
51            - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
52            - '\System32\spool\drivers\color\' # as seen in the knotweed blog
53            - '\Temporary Internet'
54            - '\Users\Public\'
55            - '\Windows\Temp\'
56            - '%appdata%'
57            - '%temp%'
58            - '%tmp%'
59    selection_susp_location_2:
60        - Details|contains|all:
61              - ':\Users\'
62              - '\Favorites\'
63        - Details|contains|all:
64              - ':\Users\'
65              - '\Favourites\'
66        - Details|contains|all:
67              - ':\Users\'
68              - '\Contacts\'
69        - Details|contains|all:
70              - ':\Users\'
71              - '\Pictures\'
72    condition: all of selection_target_* and 1 of selection_susp_location_*
73falsepositives:
74    - Unlikely
75level: high

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