COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value
Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value
2id: 790317c0-0a36-4a6a-a105-6e576bf99a14
3related:
4 - id: 3d968d17-ffa4-4bc0-bfdc-f139de76ce77
5 type: obsolete
6 - id: a0ff33d8-79e4-4cef-b4f3-9dc4133ccd12
7 type: obsolete
8status: experimental
9description: Detects potential COM object hijacking via modification of default system CLSID.
10references:
11 - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/ (idea)
12 - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/snipbot-romcom-malware-variant/
13 - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-5647-romcom/
14 - https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/darkhotel-a-cluster-of-groups-united-by-common-techniques
15 - https://threatbook.io/blog/Analysis-of-APT-C-60-Attack-on-South-Korea
16author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
17date: 2024-07-16
18modified: 2024-12-14
19tags:
20 - attack.persistence
21 - attack.t1546.015
22logsource:
23 category: registry_set
24 product: windows
25detection:
26 selection_target_root:
27 TargetObject|contains: '\CLSID\'
28 TargetObject|endswith:
29 - '\InprocServer32\(Default)'
30 - '\LocalServer32\(Default)'
31 selection_target_builtin_clsid:
32 TargetObject|contains:
33 # Note: Add other legitimate CLSID
34 - '\{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}\'
35 - '\{2155fee3-2419-4373-b102-6843707eb41f}\'
36 - '\{4590f811-1d3a-11d0-891f-00aa004b2e24}\'
37 - '\{4de225bf-cf59-4cfc-85f7-68b90f185355}\'
38 - '\{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}\'
39 - '\{F56F6FDD-AA9D-4618-A949-C1B91AF43B1A}\'
40 - '\{F82B4EF1-93A9-4DDE-8015-F7950A1A6E31}\'
41 - '\{7849596a-48ea-486e-8937-a2a3009f31a9}\'
42 - '\{0b91a74b-ad7c-4a9d-b563-29eef9167172}\'
43 - '\{603D3801-BD81-11d0-A3A5-00C04FD706EC}\'
44 selection_susp_location_1:
45 Details|contains:
46 # Note: Add more suspicious paths and locations
47 - ':\Perflogs\'
48 - '\AppData\Local\'
49 - '\Desktop\'
50 - '\Downloads\'
51 - '\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
52 - '\System32\spool\drivers\color\' # as seen in the knotweed blog
53 - '\Temporary Internet'
54 - '\Users\Public\'
55 - '\Windows\Temp\'
56 - '%appdata%'
57 - '%temp%'
58 - '%tmp%'
59 selection_susp_location_2:
60 - Details|contains|all:
61 - ':\Users\'
62 - '\Favorites\'
63 - Details|contains|all:
64 - ':\Users\'
65 - '\Favourites\'
66 - Details|contains|all:
67 - ':\Users\'
68 - '\Contacts\'
69 - Details|contains|all:
70 - ':\Users\'
71 - '\Pictures\'
72 condition: all of selection_target_* and 1 of selection_susp_location_*
73falsepositives:
74 - Unlikely
75level: high
References
Related rules
- COM Hijacking via TreatAs
- Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry
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- Potential Persistence Using DebugPath
- Potential Persistence Via Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking