Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs. This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
2id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
3related:
4 - id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f
5 type: derived
6status: experimental
7description: |
8 Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
9 This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
10references:
11 - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
12 - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
13 - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a
14 - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/
15 - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf
16 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3
17 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
18 - http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/
19 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
20author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
21date: 2022-09-09
22modified: 2024-08-15
23tags:
24 - attack.credential-access
25 - attack.discovery
26 - attack.t1552
27logsource:
28 category: process_creation
29 product: windows
30detection:
31 selection_wmi:
32 CommandLine|contains|all:
33 - 'Select'
34 - 'Win32_NTLogEvent'
35 selection_wevtutil_img:
36 - Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
37 - OriginalFileName: 'wevtutil.exe'
38 selection_wevtutil_cli:
39 CommandLine|contains:
40 - ' qe '
41 - ' query-events '
42 selection_wmic_img:
43 - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
44 - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
45 selection_wmic_cli:
46 CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent'
47 selection_cmdlet:
48 CommandLine|contains:
49 - 'Get-WinEvent '
50 - 'get-eventlog '
51 selection_logs_name:
52 CommandLine|contains:
53 # Note: Add more event log channels that are interesting for attackers
54 - 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell'
55 - 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
56 - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager'
57 - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager'
58 - 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender'
59 - 'PowerShellCore'
60 - 'Security'
61 - 'Windows PowerShell'
62 selection_logs_eid:
63 CommandLine|contains:
64 # Note: We use the "?" to account for both a single and a double quote
65 # Note: Please add additional interesting event IDs
66 # Note: As this only focuses on EIDs and we know EIDs are not unique across providers. Rare FPs might occur with legit queries to EIDs from different providers.
67 # This covers EID 4624 and 4628 from Security Log
68 - '-InstanceId 462?'
69 - '.eventid -eq 462?'
70 - 'EventCode=?462?'
71 - 'EventIdentifier=?462?'
72 - 'System[EventID=462?]'
73 # This covers EID 4778 from Security Log
74 - '-InstanceId 4778'
75 - '.eventid -eq 4778'
76 - 'System[EventID=4778]'
77 - 'EventCode=?4778?'
78 - 'EventIdentifier=?4778?'
79 # This covers EID 25 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
80 - '-InstanceId 25'
81 - '.eventid -eq 25'
82 - 'System[EventID=25]'
83 - 'EventCode=?25?'
84 - 'EventIdentifier=?25?'
85 condition: 1 of selection_logs_* and (selection_wmi or all of selection_wevtutil_* or all of selection_wmic_* or selection_cmdlet)
86falsepositives:
87 - Legitimate usage of the utility by administrators to query the event log
88level: medium
References
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