Application Bypass with DllRegisterServer Function
DLLs that are designed to be loaded by Regsvr32 are expected to have a DllRegisterServer export function implemented. Adversaries will often supply the same DLL to rundll32.exe as well. Executing the DllRegisterServer export function with rundll32.exe is tradecraft that’s unique to adversary behavior and is rarely seen in legitimate scenarios. We’ve observed this behavior in threats including Qbot, Ursnif, and Zloader, to name a few examples. Part of the RedCanary 2024 Threat Detection Report.
Sigma rule (View on GitHub)
1title: Application Bypass with DllRegisterServer Function
2id: 06c7a5b8-24dc-482c-8203-c674a7e05c56
3status: experimental
4description: |
5 DLLs that are designed to be loaded by Regsvr32 are expected to have a
6 DllRegisterServer export function implemented. Adversaries will often
7 supply the same DLL to rundll32.exe as well. Executing the DllRegisterServer
8 export function with rundll32.exe is tradecraft that’s unique to adversary
9 behavior and is rarely seen in legitimate scenarios. We’ve observed this
10 behavior in threats including Qbot, Ursnif, and Zloader, to name a few examples.
11 Part of the RedCanary 2024 Threat Detection Report.
12references:
13 - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/rundll32/
14author: RedCanary, Sigma formatting by Micah Babinski
15date: 2024/03/21
16tags:
17 - attack.defense_evasion
18 - attack.t1218
19 - attack.t1218.011
20logsource:
21 category: process_creation
22 product: windows
23detection:
24 selection:
25 Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
26 CommandLine|contains: 'DllRegisterServer'
27 condition: selection
28falsepositives:
29 - Unknown
30level: low```
References
Related rules
- Rundll32 Injection into LSASS
- Rundll32 Without a Command Line
- Rundll32 with Suspicious Process Lineage
- Suspicious Export Functionalities - Rundll32
- Application Bypass with RunDLL32 and DllRegisterServer Function