UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading
Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2020/10/26"
3integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/10/15"
6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
8
9[transform]
10[[transform.osquery]]
11label = "Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache"
12query = "SELECT * FROM dns_cache"
13
14[[transform.osquery]]
15label = "Osquery - Retrieve All Services"
16query = "SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"
17
18[[transform.osquery]]
19label = "Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts"
20query = """
21SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE
22NOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR
23user_account == null)
24"""
25
26[[transform.osquery]]
27label = "Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link"
28query = """
29SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,
30services.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =
31authenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'
32"""
33
34
35[rule]
36author = ["Elastic"]
37description = """
38Identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory.
39Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
40"""
41from = "now-9m"
42index = [
43 "winlogbeat-*",
44 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
45 "logs-windows.forwarded*",
46 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
47 "endgame-*",
48 "logs-system.security*",
49 "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
50 "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
51]
52language = "eql"
53license = "Elastic License v2"
54name = "UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading"
55note = """## Triage and analysis
56
57### Investigating UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading
58
59Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
60
61For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the [official Microsoft docs page](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works).
62
63This rule identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
64
65> **Note**:
66> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
67
68#### Possible investigation steps
69
70- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
71- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
72- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
73- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
74- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
75 - Analyze any suspicious spawned processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
76 - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
77 - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
78 - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
79 - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
80 - $osquery_0
81 - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
82 - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
83 - $osquery_1
84 - $osquery_2
85 - $osquery_3
86 - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
87- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
88
89### False positive analysis
90
91- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
92
93### Response and remediation
94
95- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
96- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
97- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
98 - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
99 - Stop suspicious processes.
100 - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
101 - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
102- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
103- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
104- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
105- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
106- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
107"""
108references = ["https://medium.com/tenable-techblog/uac-bypass-by-mocking-trusted-directories-24a96675f6e"]
109risk_score = 73
110rule_id = "290aca65-e94d-403b-ba0f-62f320e63f51"
111severity = "high"
112tags = [
113 "Domain: Endpoint",
114 "OS: Windows",
115 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
116 "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
117 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
118 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
119 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
120 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
121 "Data Source: System",
122 "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
123 "Data Source: Sysmon",
124 "Data Source: SentinelOne",
125]
126timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
127type = "eql"
128
129query = '''
130process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
131 process.args : ("C:\\Windows \\system32\\*.exe", "C:\\Windows \\SysWOW64\\*.exe")
132'''
133
134
135[[rule.threat]]
136framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
137[[rule.threat.technique]]
138id = "T1548"
139name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
140reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
141[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
142id = "T1548.002"
143name = "Bypass User Account Control"
144reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
145
146
147
148[rule.threat.tactic]
149id = "TA0004"
150name = "Privilege Escalation"
151reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
152[[rule.threat]]
153framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
154[[rule.threat.technique]]
155id = "T1036"
156name = "Masquerading"
157reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
158[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
159id = "T1036.005"
160name = "Match Legitimate Name or Location"
161reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/"
162
163
164[[rule.threat.technique]]
165id = "T1548"
166name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
167reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
168[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
169id = "T1548.002"
170name = "Bypass User Account Control"
171reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"
172
173
174
175[rule.threat.tactic]
176id = "TA0005"
177name = "Defense Evasion"
178reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating UAC Bypass Attempt via Windows Directory Masquerading
Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the official Microsoft docs page.
This rule identifies an attempt to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by masquerading as a Microsoft trusted Windows directory. Attackers may bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
Note: This investigation guide uses the Osquery Markdown Plugin introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe.
- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze any suspicious spawned processes using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process'
process.entity_id
. - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process'
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell
Get-FileHash
cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.
False positive analysis
- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
Response and remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
References
Related rules
- Bypass UAC via Event Viewer
- Adding Hidden File Attribute via Attrib
- Clearing Windows Console History
- Clearing Windows Event Logs
- Code Signing Policy Modification Through Built-in tools