Potential Veeam Credential Access Command
Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2024/03/14"
3integration = ["windows", "endpoint", "system", "m365_defender", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/11/02"
6min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
7min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."
8
9[rule]
10author = ["Elastic"]
11description = """
12Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam
13Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = [
17 "winlogbeat-*",
18 "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
19 "logs-windows.forwarded*",
20 "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
21 "endgame-*",
22 "logs-system.security*",
23 "logs-m365_defender.event-*",
24 "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
25 "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
26]
27language = "eql"
28license = "Elastic License v2"
29name = "Potential Veeam Credential Access Command"
30references = ["https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/"]
31risk_score = 47
32rule_id = "b661f86d-1c23-4ce7-a59e-2edbdba28247"
33severity = "medium"
34tags = [
35 "Domain: Endpoint",
36 "OS: Windows",
37 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
38 "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
39 "Tactic: Credential Access",
40 "Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
41 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
42 "Data Source: System",
43 "Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
44 "Data Source: Sysmon",
45 "Data Source: SentinelOne",
46 "Data Source: Crowdstrike",
47]
48timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
49type = "eql"
50
51query = '''
52process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
53 (
54 (process.name : "sqlcmd.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name : "sqlcmd.exe") or
55 process.args : ("Invoke-Sqlcmd", "Invoke-SqlExecute", "Invoke-DbaQuery", "Invoke-SqlQuery")
56 ) and
57 process.args : "*[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]*"
58'''
59
60
61[[rule.threat]]
62framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
63[[rule.threat.technique]]
64id = "T1003"
65name = "OS Credential Dumping"
66reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
67
68[[rule.threat.technique]]
69id = "T1555"
70name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
71reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
72
73
74[rule.threat.tactic]
75id = "TA0006"
76name = "Credential Access"
77reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
78[[rule.threat]]
79framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
80[[rule.threat.technique]]
81id = "T1059"
82name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
83reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
84[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
85id = "T1059.001"
86name = "PowerShell"
87reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
88
89
90
91[rule.threat.tactic]
92id = "TA0002"
93name = "Execution"
94reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
References
Related rules
- Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP
- Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping
- Microsoft IIS Connection Strings Decryption
- NTDS or SAM Database File Copied
- Potential File Transfer via Certreq