Egress Connection from Entrypoint in Container
This rule identifies a sequence of events where a process named entrypoint.sh
is started in a container, followed by a
network connection attempt. This sequence indicates a potential egress connection from an entrypoint in a container. An
entrypoint is a command or script specified in the Dockerfile and executed when the container starts. Attackers can use
this technique to establish a foothold in the environment, escape from a container to the host, or establish persistence.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2024/07/10"
3integration = ["endpoint"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2024/07/10"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10This rule identifies a sequence of events where a process named `entrypoint.sh` is started in a container, followed by a
11network connection attempt. This sequence indicates a potential egress connection from an entrypoint in a container. An
12entrypoint is a command or script specified in the Dockerfile and executed when the container starts. Attackers can use
13this technique to establish a foothold in the environment, escape from a container to the host, or establish persistence.
14"""
15from = "now-9m"
16index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
17language = "eql"
18license = "Elastic License v2"
19name = "Egress Connection from Entrypoint in Container"
20risk_score = 47
21rule_id = "c75d0c86-38d6-4821-98a1-465cff8ff4c8"
22severity = "medium"
23tags = [
24 "Domain: Endpoint",
25 "Domain: Container",
26 "OS: Linux",
27 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
28 "Tactic: Execution",
29 "Data Source: Elastic Defend",
30]
31timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
32type = "eql"
33query = '''
34sequence by host.id with maxspan=3s
35 [process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
36 process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type == "container" and process.name == "entrypoint.sh"] by process.entity_id
37 [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and not (
38 destination.ip == null or destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or cidrmatch(
39 destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
40 "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
41 "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
42 "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
43 "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
44 )
45 )] by process.parent.entity_id
46'''
47
48[[rule.threat]]
49framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
50
51[[rule.threat.technique]]
52id = "T1059"
53name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
54reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
55
56[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
57id = "T1059.004"
58name = "Unix Shell"
59reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
60
61[rule.threat.tactic]
62id = "TA0002"
63name = "Execution"
64reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
65
66[[rule.threat]]
67framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
68
69[[rule.threat.technique]]
70id = "T1611"
71name = "Escape to Host"
72reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/"
73
74[rule.threat.tactic]
75id = "TA0004"
76name = "Privilege Escalation"
77reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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