Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location

Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution. Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.

Sigma rule (View on GitHub)

  1title: Legitimate Application Writing Files In Uncommon Location
  2id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
  3related:
  4    - id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac # bitsadmin dedicated rule
  5      type: similar
  6status: experimental
  7description: |
  8    Detects legitimate applications writing any type of file to uncommon or suspicious locations that are not typical for application data storage or execution.
  9    Adversaries may leverage legitimate applications (Living off the Land Binaries - LOLBins) to drop or download malicious files to uncommon locations on the system to evade detection by security solutions.    
 10references:
 11    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
 12author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
 13date: 2025-12-10
 14modified: 2026-10-26
 15tags:
 16    - attack.stealth
 17    - attack.t1218
 18    - attack.command-and-control
 19    - attack.t1105
 20logsource:
 21    product: windows
 22    category: file_event
 23detection:
 24    selection_img:
 25        Image|endswith:
 26            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
 27            - '\eqnedt32.exe'
 28            - '\wordpad.exe'
 29            - '\wordview.exe'
 30            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
 31            - '\cmdl32.exe'
 32            - '\certutil.exe'
 33            - '\certoc.exe'
 34            - '\CertReq.exe'
 35            - '\bitsadmin.exe'
 36            - '\Desktopimgdownldr.exe'
 37            - '\esentutl.exe'
 38            - '\expand.exe'
 39            - '\extrac32.exe'
 40            - '\replace.exe'
 41            - '\mshta.exe'
 42            - '\ftp.exe'
 43            - '\Ldifde.exe'
 44            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
 45            - '\hh.exe'
 46            - '\finger.exe'
 47            - '\findstr.exe'
 48    selection_locations:
 49        TargetFilename|contains:
 50            - ':\Perflogs'
 51            - ':\ProgramData\'
 52            - ':\Temp\'
 53            - ':\Users\Public\'
 54            - ':\Windows\'
 55            - '\$Recycle.Bin\'
 56            - '\AppData\Local\'
 57            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
 58            - '\Contacts\'
 59            - '\Desktop\'
 60            - '\Favorites\'
 61            - '\Favourites\'
 62            - '\inetpub\wwwroot\'
 63            - '\Music\'
 64            - '\Pictures\'
 65            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
 66            - '\Users\Default\'
 67            - '\Videos\'
 68    filter_optional_dell_techhub_repair:
 69        # Dell TechHub runs "esentutl /p" on its SRUDB copy; the repair scratch files land in the working directory (System32)
 70        Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
 71        TargetFilename|startswith:
 72            - 'C:\Windows\System32\SRUDB_'
 73            - 'C:\Windows\System32\TEMPREPAIR'
 74        TargetFilename|endswith:
 75            - '.INTEG.RAW'
 76            - '.EDB'
 77    filter_optional_dell_techhub_copy:
 78        Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
 79        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\ProgramData\Dell\DTP\DB\SRUDBData\'
 80    filter_optional_expand_system_dpx_scratch:
 81        # expand.exe run as SYSTEM by services (e.g. the Waves MaxxAudio driver service unpacking MaxxAudio_Data.cab) writes its own "<hex>$dpx$.tmp" scratch files into the Windows Temp folder
 82        Image|endswith: '\expand.exe'
 83        User|contains: # covers many language settings
 84            - 'AUTHORI'
 85            - 'AUTORI'
 86        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
 87        TargetFilename|endswith: '$dpx$.tmp'
 88    filter_optional_certutil_rootcas_sst:
 89        # "certutil -generateSSTFromWU" run as SYSTEM (e.g. by EDR agents refreshing the trusted root list) writes RootCAs.sst into a SystemTemp subfolder
 90        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
 91        User|contains: # covers many language settings
 92            - 'AUTHORI'
 93            - 'AUTORI'
 94        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
 95        TargetFilename|endswith: '\RootCAs.sst'
 96    condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
 97falsepositives:
 98    - Unknown
 99level: high
100regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml

References

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