Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN
Detects when a Google Workspace account completes OAuth authorization for a specific Google OAuth client from a high-risk autonomous system number (ASN), followed within 30 seconds by a device registration event with account state REGISTERED. This sequence can indicate device enrollment or join flows initiated from attacker-controlled or residential-proxy infrastructure after a user authorizes a sensitive client.
Elastic rule (View on GitHub)
1[metadata]
2creation_date = "2026/05/15"
3integration = ["google_workspace"]
4maturity = "production"
5updated_date = "2026/05/15"
6
7[rule]
8author = ["Elastic"]
9description = """
10Detects when a Google Workspace account completes OAuth authorization for a specific Google OAuth client from a
11high-risk autonomous system number (ASN), followed within 30 seconds by a device registration event with account state
12REGISTERED. This sequence can indicate device enrollment or join flows initiated from attacker-controlled or
13residential-proxy infrastructure after a user authorizes a sensitive client.
14"""
15false_positives = [
16 """
17 Users on VPNs, carrier NAT, or cloud egress that map to flagged ASNs may match. Legitimate bulk enrollment or
18 scripted onboarding that uses the same OAuth client can also produce the sequence. Baseline `source.as.organization.name`
19 and successful registration sources before adding exclusions.
20 """,
21]
22from = "now-15m"
23index = ["logs-google_workspace*"]
24interval = "5m"
25language = "eql"
26license = "Elastic License v2"
27name = "Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN"
28note = """## Triage and analysis
29
30### Investigating Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN
31
32Review `user.name`, `user.email`, `source.ip`, `source.as.organization.name`, `google_workspace.token.client.id`,
33`google_workspace.token.app_name`, and device fields on the second event (for example device display name or ID if
34present in your schema).
35
36Confirm whether the user intentionally registered a device and whether the OAuth client and ASN are expected for your
37mobile device management or enrollment program.
38
39### Possible investigation steps
40
41- Correlate both events on `user.name` and timestamps to confirm the sequence is a single enrollment story.
42- Revoke or audit OAuth grants for the client if the authorization was not expected.
43- Search for additional `google_workspace.device` registrations from the same ASN in the same period.
44
45### Response and remediation
46
47- If malicious, remove the unauthorized device from the Google Admin console, reset the user password, and revoke
48 active sessions and tokens per incident policy.
49- Restrict device registration and review OAuth app access policies.
50
51## Setup
52
53The Google Workspace Fleet integration or Filebeat Google Workspace module must ingest `google_workspace.token` and
54`google_workspace.device` audit streams.
55
56### Event lag
57
58Google Workspace audit data can lag minutes to days behind real time. If sequences are missed, increase `from` and
59lower the integration poll interval per Google and Elastic documentation.
60"""
61references = [
62 "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/google-workspace-attack-surface-part-one",
63 "https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566",
64]
65risk_score = 73
66rule_id = "012bfca7-45cb-4507-a3ba-3777167f8b81"
67severity = "high"
68tags = [
69 "Domain: Cloud",
70 "Data Source: Google Workspace",
71 "Use Case: Threat Detection",
72 "Tactic: Persistence",
73 "Tactic: Initial Access",
74 "Threat: Tycoon2FA",
75 "Resources: Investigation Guide",
76]
77timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
78type = "eql"
79
80query = '''
81sequence by user.name with maxspan=30s
82 [iam where data_stream.dataset == "google_workspace.token" and event.action == "authorize" and
83 google_workspace.token.client.id == "77185425430.apps.googleusercontent.com" and
84 source.as.number in (9009, 45102, 215540, 29802, 62240, 204957, 395092)]
85 [any where data_stream.dataset == "google_workspace.device" and google_workspace.device.account_state == "REGISTERED"]
86'''
87
88
89[[rule.threat]]
90framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
91
92[[rule.threat.technique]]
93id = "T1098"
94name = "Account Manipulation"
95reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
96
97[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
98id = "T1098.005"
99name = "Device Registration"
100reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005/"
101
102[rule.threat.tactic]
103id = "TA0003"
104name = "Persistence"
105reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
106
107[[rule.threat]]
108framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
109
110[[rule.threat.technique]]
111id = "T1566"
112name = "Phishing"
113reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
114
115[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
116id = "T1566.002"
117name = "Spearphishing Link"
118reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/"
119
120[rule.threat.tactic]
121id = "TA0001"
122name = "Initial Access"
123reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
Triage and analysis
Investigating Google Workspace Device Registration After OAuth from Suspicious ASN
Review user.name, user.email, source.ip, source.as.organization.name, google_workspace.token.client.id,
google_workspace.token.app_name, and device fields on the second event (for example device display name or ID if
present in your schema).
Confirm whether the user intentionally registered a device and whether the OAuth client and ASN are expected for your mobile device management or enrollment program.
Possible investigation steps
- Correlate both events on
user.nameand timestamps to confirm the sequence is a single enrollment story. - Revoke or audit OAuth grants for the client if the authorization was not expected.
- Search for additional
google_workspace.deviceregistrations from the same ASN in the same period.
Response and remediation
- If malicious, remove the unauthorized device from the Google Admin console, reset the user password, and revoke active sessions and tokens per incident policy.
- Restrict device registration and review OAuth app access policies.
Setup
The Google Workspace Fleet integration or Filebeat Google Workspace module must ingest google_workspace.token and
google_workspace.device audit streams.
Event lag
Google Workspace audit data can lag minutes to days behind real time. If sequences are missed, increase from and
lower the integration poll interval per Google and Elastic documentation.
References
Related rules
- Entra ID OAuth Device Code Phishing via AiTM
- Entra ID Potential AiTM Sign-In via OfficeHome (Tycoon2FA)
- M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA)
- Entra ID OAuth PRT Issuance to Non-Managed Device Detected
- GitHub Actions Unusual Bot Push to Repository